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SANCTIONS AND STRUCTURAL REFORM 
BETH A. COLGAN† 
ABSTRACT
In recent years, increased attention is being paid to the dangers of 
imposing economic sanctions in felony, misdemeanor, juvenile, 
municipal, and traffic courts because the imposition of unmanageable 
fines, fees, surcharges, restitution, and forfeitures can be financially 
devastating for people and their families. One reform that has gained 
traction is the graduation of economic sanctions to account for their 
financial effect. To date, considerations of the efficacy of graduated 
sanctions focus on the individual benefits that would accrue from a 
properly designed graduation mechanism. In other words, the value of 
graduation is measured by comparing it to the serious negative 
consequences for individuals that may result from the imposition of 
ungraduated sanctions. This Article uses abolitionism as a heuristic 
because it changes the baseline, measuring graduation against a 
fundamentally different set of goals: the dismantling of the carceral 
state and its replacement with systems of “transformative justice.” 
Doing so indicates that graduation is in some ways consistent with and 
in other ways in opposition to structural reforms of criminal legal 
systems writ large. This Article uses those insights to identify potential 
complementary reforms designed to bring graduation in better 
alignment with structural reform efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, police officers pulled over Kisha Snider in the small, 
central Oklahoma town of Boley.1 Boley has a venerable history: 
founded in 1904, it became a prosperous, primarily black, community, 
boasting the country’s first black-owned electric company and bank 
and described by Booker T. Washington as “the most interesting and 
enterprising negro town in the U.S.”2 But by the time the police 
stopped Ms. Snider, Bolely’s population had shrunk to just over 1,000 
people,3 and with the town’s per capita income at only $3,255 annually, 
nearly 62 percent of its residents lived below the federal poverty line.4 
Though the police originally justified stopping Ms. Snider because she 
violated the town’s traffic laws by putting on her turn signal too early, 
turning too wide, and having a nonworking light over her license plate, 
the stop led to a search of Ms. Snider’s vehicle during which the officers 
uncovered two marijuana joints.5 
 1. Cary Aspinwall, ‘We’re Going Home!’: More than 500 Oklahoma Inmates Freed in 
Historic Release, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/nov/05/oklahoma-inmates-prison-historic-mass-release [https://perma.cc/RP7X-M8CY].
 2. Erica Taylor, Little Known Black History Fact: Boley, Oklahoma, 
BLACKAMERICAWEB.COM, https://blackamericaweb.com/2012/10/30/little-known-black-
history-fact-boley-oklahoma [https://perma.cc/XL9S-798L]. 
3. Community Facts: Boley Town, Oklahoma, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk 
[https://perma.cc/SRX5-ZF8B] (search state, county, city, town, or zip code field for “Boley town, 
Oklahoma”). 
4. Selected Economic Characteristics: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates, Boley, Oklahoma, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/ 
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF [https://perma.cc/5KWL-84B7]. 
5. See Aspinwall, supra note 1. 
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Because she would face years in prison if convicted of marijuana 
possession, Ms. Snider agreed to a drug-court diversionary program.6 
Oklahoma’s program can include a wide array of requirements, 
including the payment of “court costs, treatment costs, drug testing 
costs, a program user fee not to exceed Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per 
month, and necessary supervision fees.”7 Though a court may waive 
the fees if it finds a person is indigent,8 the court ordered Ms. Snider— 
who made $8.10 per hour as a nurse’s aid from which she supported 
herself and her four children—to pay.9 When she proved unable to 
keep up with the payments, the court removed her from the 
diversionary program and sent her to state prison.10
Several months later and eighty miles away, Muskogee County 
Sheriff deputies pulled over Eh Wah for having a broken taillight.11 The 
deputies would later claim that their K-9 drug-detection dog positively 
alerted to the car,12 providing the necessary probable cause for the 
deputies to search Mr. Wah’s vehicle.13 Mr. Wah, a U.S. citizen who 
came to America as a refugee from Burma, had been on the road for 
months volunteering with a Christian rock band; the tour had 
generated over $42,000 in ticket and merchandise sales and donations, 
the bulk of which the band intended to donate to a religious college in 
Burma and an orphanage in Thailand that served displaced children.14 
Mr. Wah was also carrying an additional $11,000, most of which had 
been a gift from one band member’s family and friends, as well as 
monies intended to cover the expenses of the trip.15 Though no drugs 
6. Id.
 7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.6(H) (2019). 
8. See id.
 9. See Aspinwall, supra note 1. 
 10. See id. (explaining that Ms. Snider struggled to make the payments and that “she decided 
it was just easier to go to prison”). 
 11. See Christopher Ingraham, How Police Took $53,000 from a Christian Band, an 
Orphanage and a Church, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2016, 9:18 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/25/how-oklahoma-cops-took-53000-
from-a-burmese-christian-band-a-church-in-omaha-and-an-orphanage-in-thailand [https://perma.cc/
X6P5-8MVJ]. 
12. Affidavit at 1, State v. Wah, No. 2016-2471 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/files/2016/04/affidavit.pdf?tid=lk_inline_manu 
al_10 [https://perma.cc/8GQ4-F8TA]. 
 13. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 410 (2005) (upholding the use of a K-9 
during a routine traffic stop in a case in which the dog’s alert provided the probable cause 
necessary to search the vehicle). 
 14. Ingraham, supra note 11. 
 15. Id.
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were found in the vehicle, the deputies determined that the K-9 alert, 
“inconsistent stories” told by Mr. Wah—who had limited English 
proficiency—and his inability to document the source of the funds on 
the spot were sufficient evidence that Mr. Wah obtained the money by 
committing drug crimes, and so the deputies seized the cash as crime 
proceeds.16 
In recent years, news reports like these about the dangers of 
imposing economic sanctions in felony, misdemeanor, juvenile, 
municipal, and traffic courts have proliferated. These reports have told 
the stories of people locked in perpetual debt, forced to choose 
between paying for necessities as basic as toilet paper17 or paying 
unmanageable fines, surcharges, fees, and restitution,18 the 
nonpayment of which could lead to serious consequences—in Ms. 
Snider’s case, years of incarceration.19 Reports also document how 
people—including those never convicted of a crime—lose houses, cars, 
and life savings through forfeitures of cash and property.20 
One reform that has gained traction is the graduation of economic 
sanctions to account for their real-world consequences. Graduation of 
fines, fees, surcharges, and restitution would involve an assessment of 
a person’s sources of income and living expenses to determine her 
ability to pay and then a reduction of any sanctions to a manageable 
amount.21 For forfeitures, graduation would require assessing how the 
loss of the cash or property at issue would affect a person’s financial 
and social stability and then the return of a portion of the proceeds 
from such forfeitures if necessary to avoid unwarranted financial 
repercussions from the loss.22 Some jurisdictions have no mechanism 
for graduation in place, and in some of those that do, the requirement 
 16. See Affidavit, supra note 12, at 1; Ingraham, supra note 11; see also infra notes 45, 76–85 
and accompanying text. 
 17. See  CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION:
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 34–35 (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5GG-
29GB].
18. For a description of these forms of economic sanctions, see infra Part I. 
 19. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 20. E.g., Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and 
Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with 
Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/ 
2014/09/06/stop-and-seize [https://perma.cc/VR6S-ALPF]. 
 21. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 101, 131–33 and accompanying text. 
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is either ignored or inartfully applied23—as apparently was the case for 
Ms. Snider.24 Nevertheless, as the electorate and appellate courts have 
become more aware of the negative consequences of unmanageable 
economic sanctions, there has been an increase in the number of 
jurisdictions that require graduation or that have engaged in efforts to 
improve existing systems to ensure graduation accurately discerns a 
person’s financial condition.25 
Graduation is necessarily an individualized inquiry, the efficacy of 
which has been measured against the baseline of ungraduated
economic sanctions. It is unsurprising, then, that most discussions of 
the reform in the literature and the popular press—including in this 
author’s own work—focus on the benefits that would accrue to people 
and their families if a properly designed graduation mechanism were 
adopted.26 
 23. See, e.g., MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN &
NOAH ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 
AND FINES: A FISCAL ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES AND TEN COUNTIES 5, 9, 40 (2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3M7-KZHR] (“Judges rarely hold hearings to establish defendants’ ability to 
pay.”).
 24. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. This Article begins from the premise that 
the mechanism for determining the effect of economic sanctions on a person’s financial and social 
well-being is designed to rely on objective criteria specifically tied to that person’s circumstances. 
As others have noted, poorly designed graduation mechanisms risk exacerbating other forms of 
discrimination. See Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective 
Policy Responses to Modern Debtors’ Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 122–23 (2015). For 
example, if a system allows a judge to discount negative fiscal consequences due to a belief that a 
person has not tried hard enough to find work, it would fail to account for larger structural issues 
such as racial or gender discrimination in employment. See, e.g., id. at 118–19; Theresa Zhen, 
(Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-To-Pay Determinations Are Inadequate To Transform a 
Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 193–200 (2019). For 
discussions of institutional-design considerations aimed at achieving objectivity in graduation 
assessments, see generally BETH A. COLGAN, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, ADDRESSING MODERN 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS WITH GRADUATED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO 
PAY (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Colgan_PP_201903014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66FD-UVWQ] [hereinafter COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’
PRISONS] and Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103 
IOWA L. REV. 53 (2017) [hereinafter Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions].
26. I became interested in the concept of graduation through my work regarding the Eighth 
Amendment’s excessive fines clause. See Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, Financial 
Hardship and the Excessive Fines Clause: Assessing the Severity of Property Forfeitures After 
Timbs, 129 YALE L.J. F. 253, 253–56 (2020); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 319–37 (2014) [hereinafter Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause]; 
Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 2, 46–75 (2018) [hereinafter Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison]. The 
Supreme Court has rarely interpreted the clause but has indicated that consideration of the 
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There is reason to believe, however, that graduation may have 
implications for the broader structure of criminal legal systems that are 
not apparent if the reform is measured only against that baseline. Take, 
for example, Oklahoma. Had Ms. Snider the capacity to pay the 
various fees the court imposed on her for her participation in the 
diversion program, the revenues would have been divided between 
“the court clerk for the benefit and administration of the drug court 
program,” the providers of any treatment, drug testing, or supervision 
services, and the State Treasury for use by the Department of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse Services’ Drug Abuse Education and 
Treatment Revolving Fund.27 And if successfully processed as a 
forfeiture, up to 100 percent of the cash the deputies seized from Mr. 
Wah would accrue to various funds used to support law enforcement 
and prosecution, including to Muskogee County to support the very 
type of drug-enforcement action that had ensnared Mr. Wah.28 In fact, 
over the last several years, Oklahoma has generated an average of 
nearly $7 million dollars in annual revenue statewide from cash and 
property forfeitures that can be distributed for those purposes.29 By 
looking only at how a reduction in fees or return of cash would be more 
equitable and fair to Ms. Snider and Mr. Wah, the question of how 
those same acts affect Oklahoma’s criminal legal system writ large 
remain unexamined. 
In an effort to engage critically with the structural implications of 
graduation, this Article relies on abolitionism because it “inverts [the] 
baseline”30 by measuring reforms not against the status quo but instead 
against a fundamentally different set of goals: the dismantling of the 
carceral state and its replacement with systems of “transformative 
financial effect of economic sanctions may be relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the 
punishment. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–88 (2019) (describing Magna Carta as a 
predecessor of the excessive fines clause and emphasizing its principle that economic sanctions 
should “not be so large as to deprive [a person] of his livelihood” (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989))). My interest in this constitutional 
issue led me to consider how a system might fairly and effectively graduate economic sanctions to 
account for such effects. See generally  COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS, 
supra note 25; Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 25. 
 27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 471.6(H) (2019). 
 28. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-503, -506, -508 (2019). 
 29. See Policing for Profit: Oklahoma, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/pfp-state-pages/pfp-
oklahoma [https://perma.cc/26WC-EPVA]. 
 30. See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 443 
(2018) (arguing that scholars should use radical social movements grounded in abolitionism to 
interrogate crime policy).
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justice.”31 Though more often associated with the abolition of prisons 
and jails than the use of economic sanctions, abolitionism provides a 
particularly useful heuristic to address this question because 
abolitionists distinguish between technocratic reforms that merely 
improve criminal legal systems and more radical reforms that disrupt 
those systems.32 Abolitionism is especially helpful here given that it 
requires examination of economic and political pressures to provide 
necessary context for crime policy.33 
At first glance, because a properly designed system of graduating 
economic sanctions would allow people to extricate themselves from 
punishment sooner,34 it appears to fit well within abolitionist principles 
as a mechanism for transformative change rather than mere 
technocratic repair. In fact, early abolitionists cited graduation as a 
possible remedy to society’s reliance on prisons as a form of 
punishment. In 1976, the Prison Research Education Action Project 
(“PREAP”), a collective of abolitionist leaders, released an influential 
publication, Instead of Prisons: A Handbook for Abolitionists.35 In it, 
they offered a variety of alternatives to incarceration, including the use 
of restitution and fines.36 In doing so, the authors pointed favorably to 
the European “day-fines” model, under which the amount of a fine 
imposed is determined by multiplying a person’s daily income—minus 
 31. See, e.g., GENERATION FIVE, TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE: A LIBERATORY 
APPROACH TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMATE AND COMMUNITY 
VIOLENCE 5 (2007), http://www.generationfive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/G5_Toward_ 
Transformative_Justice-Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7Y6-LJ4U]. Within abolitionism, 
terminology is contestable. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1630–31 (2019) (distinguishing “transformative” and “restorative” justice) 
[hereinafter McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy]. For ease of reference, this Article 
refers to “transformative justice” to describe the overarching approach to replacing the carceral 
state. “Restorative justice” refers to a particular aspect of that replacement, which involves the 
manner in which communities could respond to behaviors that cause harm through programs that 
focus on accountability and community well-being rather than punishment. See infra Part II.B.2. 
As used in this Article, restorative justice programs are totally distinct from and unrelated to 
carceral systems. See GENERATION FIVE, supra, at 21 (rejecting restorative justice programs that 
have been “co-opted” into traditional criminal legal systems such as post-incarceration reentry 
programming). 
 32. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 20–21, 103–04 (2003) [hereinafter 
DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?]. 
 33. See id. at 85 (regarding the importance of “tak[ing] into account economic and political 
structures and ideologies”). 
 34. Infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text. 
 35. FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., PRISON RESEARCH EDUC. ACTION PROJECT, INSTEAD OF 
PRISONS: A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITIONISTS (Mark Morris ed., 1976).
 36. Id. at 14, 22, 63, 102, 118–24. 
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deductions for living expenses and the like—with a penalty unit based 
on the seriousness of the given offense.37 The authors deemed the use 
of graduated economic sanctions transformative because it did not 
involve incarceration, allowed people to remain and participate in their 
communities, and presumably decreased the amount of money 
entering state coffers that would otherwise be used to finance custodial 
and community supervision.38 
Yet despite an early embrace of graduating economic sanctions as 
consistent with abolitionist principles, that understanding may be 
anachronistic. Though American governments have used economic 
sanctions as punishment and to recoup system costs since the colonial 
era,39 the massive expansion of fees, surcharges, restitution, and 
forfeitures in effect today had not yet occurred at the time PREAP 
wrote Instead of Prisons.40 The handbook’s authors also placed too 
much faith in the idea that trial courts would adhere to constitutional 
restrictions on the conversion of economic sanctions to incarceration,41 
while in reality many courts have flatly ignored the constitutional 
prohibitions imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court on such practices.42 
Therefore, to assess the efficacy of graduation anew, this Article 
proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of economic 
sanctions in the United States—the prevalence of their use, the 
distribution of revenues to fund criminal legal systems and other public 
projects, and the push in recent years for the adoption of meaningful 
graduation mechanisms. Part II then applies abolitionism using its two 
 37. Id. at 122–24. 
 38. See id. at 123. 
 39. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 26, at 302–19.
 40. See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. 
 41. See  KNOPP ET AL., supra note 35, at 122 (citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), in 
which the Court struck down the automatic conversion of economic sanctions to incarceration for 
those who could not pay). 
 42. See, e.g., Marsh & Gerrick, supra note 25, at 120–21 (discussing evidence that courts have 
ignored Supreme Court precedent); Don McNay, Debtor’s Prisons in Kentucky and Other 
Horrors of the Justice System, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:24 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/debtors-prisons-in-kentuc_b_5980624 [https://perma.cc/TT3M-
NKDW] (describing the response of a judge in Bullitt County, Kentucky, after an attorney 
informed him that Supreme Court precedent precluded him from incarcerating a person who 
could not pay economic sanctions as follows: “Here is the problem. You are not in the United 
States Supreme Court. You are in my court, and the man is going to jail.”); see also CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 42–62 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN36-JXHK] [hereinafter FERGUSON 
REPORT] (detailing abuses in Ferguson, Missouri’s municipal courts). 
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key goals as the baseline against which graduation is assessed: 
dismantling criminal legal systems and then replacing them with 
systems of transformative justice. This examination reveals that 
properly designed graduation mechanisms can be of great value to 
individuals who would otherwise be subjected to financially crippling 
economic sanctions that can keep them ensnared in criminal legal 
systems. It may also shrink funding streams used to prop up such 
systems, aid in funding other social programs targeted at addressing the 
root causes of crime, and increase restitution collections as well as 
better address the nonmonetary needs of crime survivors. At the same 
time, however, graduation programs risk cementing the status quo by 
increasing revenue in some cases and thus disincentivizing critical 
examination of the scope and punitiveness of criminal legal systems, 
exacerbating inequalities created through mechanisms for distributing 
economic sanction revenues, and neglecting to force attention to the 
ways in which current systems of restitution fundamentally fail 
survivors. In other words, graduation as a reform is incomplete if 
divorced from broader efforts at structural transformation. Given the 
limitations of graduation revealed by viewing it through an abolitionist 
lens, this Article concludes in Part III by briefly identifying additional 
measures, along with their limitations, that could be adopted in 
conjunction with the graduation of economic sanctions and which are 
aimed at better securing structural transformation. 
I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE PUSH FOR GRADUATION
Economic sanctions constitute the most common form of 
punishment in the United States. All levels of courts—traffic and 
municipal courts, juvenile courts, and misdemeanor and felony courts 
at the local, state, and federal level—use economic sanctions, including 
fines, fees, surcharges, and restitution, to punish people43 found to have 
violated one or more of a vast network of offenses.44 State and federal 
 43. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 2 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue 
_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVH2-STLG]; JESSICA FEIERMAN WITH NAOMI GOLDSTEIN,
EMILY HANEY-CARON & JAYMES FAIRFAX COLUMBO, JUVENILE LAW CTR., DEBTORS’
PRISON FOR KIDS?: THE HIGH COST OF FINES AND FEES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4– 
22 (2016), https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ4H-
2BFW]. 
 44. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 703–12 
(2005) (describing the metastasizing of laws prohibiting a variety of conduct in the United States). 
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laws—and in some jurisdictions, local laws—also allow for the 
forfeiture of cash and property.45 The primary grounds for the 
government’s retention of forfeited assets is twofold. One basis is that 
the items in question constitute proceeds of criminal activity or were 
purchased with crime proceeds.46 Forfeitures are also allowed for cash 
or property that served as instrumentalities of an offense, meaning that 
a person used the property in some way during the commission of a 
crime,47 such as a car used during the solicitation of prostitution.48 
Although economic sanctions have been in use since the colonial 
era,49 the imposition of fees and surcharges in particular has boomed in 
recent decades. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government began 
to heavily subsidize the “War on Crime,” distributing funds and 
equipment that state and local governments used to build up law 
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies and to expand jail and prison 
infrastructures.50 The federal government continues to provide 
financial assistance for state and local criminal legal systems, but that 
funding decreased significantly by the early 1980s.51 And so—eager to 
avoid tax increases and at times hamstrung from raising tax revenues 
by newly enacted state restrictions52—lawmakers increasingly turned 
to economic sanctions53 to fund the systems of mass incarceration, mass 
supervision, and mass surveillance that began developing in the 1960s 
 45. See generally DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 2008). 
 46. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2018) (allowing for the forfeiture of crime proceeds, 
including property traceable to such proceeds).
 47. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a)(2), 881(a) (2018) (allowing for the forfeiture of 
instrumentalities). 
 48. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that the forfeiture of a 
jointly owned car used by a husband to engage in sexual activity for payment did not violate the 
wife’s interests under the takings clause despite the state statute’s lack of an innocent owner 
defense).
 49. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 26, at 302–19. 
 50. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 94, 143, 150–51, 159, 172–74, 189–91, 281 
(2016). 
 51. See Karin D. Martin, Monetary Myopia: An Examination of Institutional Response to 
Revenue from Monetary Sanctions for Misdemeanors, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 630, 636–39 
(2018) (discussing decreases in federal funding that had been provided to states through the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration). 
 52. See, e.g., MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 6, 39 (describing restrictions on taxing 
passed by Oklahoma in 1992 and a 1998 state constitutional amendment in Florida requiring 
courts to self-fund through fines, fees, and surcharges). 
 53. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 43, at 2–3; Martin, supra note 51, at 
636–39. 
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and that would continue to flourish during the tough-on-crime boom 
of the 1980s and 1990s through today.54 Fines have long been used to 
fund both criminal legal systems and other public expenditures,55 but 
lawmakers additionally began devising an array of administrative fees 
to be imposed on people accused or convicted of violating the law, 
which were aimed at recouping system costs, including fees linked to 
expenditures for law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts, indigent 
defense services, pre- and post-trial incarceration, probation and 
parole supervision, court processes, and collection efforts.56 
Lawmakers in many jurisdictions also created an array of surcharges— 
essentially fines on top of fines—used to fund criminal legal 
processes,57 as well as to supplement general coffers and underwrite 
public works as diverse as infrastructure projects,58 education 
services,59 and election systems.60 
The use of forfeitures has also skyrocketed in recent years. 
Between 1970 and 1984, Congress passed a series of statutes that 
shifted forfeiture revenue from general coffers to direct retention by 
 54. See, e.g., JOE SOSS, RICHARD C. FORDING & SANFORD F. SCHRAM, DISCIPLINING THE 
POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 101–11 (2011). 
Restitution also began to expand during this period, as states moved restitution into criminal 
sentencing and in some cases subjected the survivor’s losses to multipliers to significantly increase 
restitution amounts. See generally Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 93 (2014) (providing a history of restitution practices in the United States).
 55. See, e.g., Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 26, at 306, 308, 313–14 
(describing the use of fines and forfeitures to pay jury costs, qui tam prosecutors, and law 
enforcement expenses in the colonies and early American states). Today, the distribution of 
revenues generated from the imposition of fines varies from place to place, and it may be allocated 
in whole or in part to the jurisdiction’s general fund or be designated for a specific use. See, e.g.,
MATT BURRESS & BEN JOHNSON, MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, TRAFFIC CITATIONS 7–9 
(2019), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/trafcit.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4XU-FDFP] 
(detailing Minnesota’s distribution of traffic violation fine revenue under various circumstances 
to state or local general funds or other designated accounts).
 56. See, e.g., MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 6; Nathan W. Link, Criminal Justice Debt 
During the Prisoner Reintegration Process: Who Has It and How Much?, 46 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 154, 155 (2019).
 57. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON 
PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 10, 11 (2015), 
https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-
Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/8G84-YD4B].
 58. See, e.g., MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 6; Prisoners of Debt: Justice System 
Imposes Steep Fines, Fees, OKLA. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2015), https://oklahomawatch.org/ 
2015/01/31/justice-system-steeps-many-offenders-in-debt [http://perma.cc/3JXF-2VZE].
 59. See, e.g., infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-954(C) (2019) (funding Arizona’s Clean Elections 
program). 
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federal law enforcement and prosecutorial offices.61 The idea behind 
this shift was that forfeiture dollars would not only drain resources 
from people engaged in lawbreaking, but it would also simultaneously 
fund the expanding criminal legal apparatus, particularly as it related 
to drug- and organized-crime enforcement.62 As then–Attorney 
General Richard Thornburgh explained in 1989: “It is truly satisfying 
to think that it is now possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a 
forfeiture-financed prison, after being arrested by agents driving a 
forfeiture-provided automobile, while working in a forfeiture-funded 
sting operation.”63 
Following the expansion of forfeiture at the federal level, local and 
state lawmakers soon followed suit with their own forfeiture statutes.64 
Additionally, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created 
what is known as the “Equitable Sharing” Program, which provides 
two avenues for local and state governments to coordinate with the 
federal government on forfeiture activities. First, if local and state law 
enforcement participate in a federal operation, the federal government 
awards a portion of associated forfeiture revenues to the state or local 
entity dependent on the extent of its participation.65 Second, even if the 
law enforcement activity through which property is seized is unrelated 
to a federal operation, the federal government can adopt cash and 
property seized by local and state law enforcement, returning up to 80 
percent of the value of the forfeited money directly to the agencies 
 61. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–890, 951–971 (2018)); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)).  
 62. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, 
Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2116 (2007); Eric Blumenson & 
Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
35, 42 (1998). 
63. Shawn Kantor, Carl Kitchens & Steven Pawlowski, Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and 
Police Incentives: Evidence from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, at 4 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23873, 2017). 
 64. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken [http://perma.cc/P5RY-XZEB].
 65. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A), (e)(3). 
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involved so long as the alleged offense could have been charged under 
federal law.66 
As with other forms of economic sanctions, the distribution of 
forfeiture revenues is dependent on the jurisdiction and the mechanism 
through which the forfeiture is processed. Federally retained forfeiture 
proceeds are typically designated for use by law enforcement and 
prosecutorial agencies as well as for restitution or to fund victim-
compensation programs.67 Federal law also requires that monies 
distributed through the Equitable Sharing Program be used solely for 
law enforcement or prosecutorial purposes.68 State and local 
distribution laws, on the other hand, vary to a greater degree. In the 
majority of jurisdictions, a significant percentage of,69 and in some cases 
all,70 proceeds from forfeitures accrue to law enforcement and 
prosecutorial agencies. In others, forfeitures must be placed in the 
jurisdiction’s general fund or are otherwise designated for purposes 
outside of the criminal legal system.71 
 66. See  OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORDER NO. 3946-2017,
FEDERAL FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY SEIZED BY STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES (2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-mlars/file/985631/download [https://perma.cc/
4KKC-TYFY]. Originally, the federal government returned up to 90 percent, but the statute was 
later amended to allow it to retain a higher percentage of the forfeited cash or property’s value. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING 
FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download [http://perma.cc/N37K-TWVS]
[hereinafter GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING]. 
 67. See Stillman, supra note 64 (reporting that between January 2012 and August 2013, “the 
Department of Justice ha[d] turned over more than $1.5 billion in forfeited assets to four hundred 
thousand crime victims, often in cases of corporate criminality”); About: Treasury Executive 
Office for Asset Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Pages/The-Executive-Office-for-Asset-Forfeiture.aspx [http://perma.cc/5N54-Q3KJ]
(explaining that asset forfeiture funds are used for law enforcement and related purposes); Asset 
Forfeiture Program: The Fund, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund 
[http://perma.cc/6BLK-DGHH] (explaining that forfeiture revenues must be used to cover the 
costs of forfeiture operations or to “finance certain general investigative expenses”). 
 68. See GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 66, at 13–18 (stating that “[s]hared 
funds must be used to increase or supplement the resources of the receiving state or local law 
enforcement agency” and providing a list of permissible law enforcement uses). Despite this 
requirement, at least some local lawmakers appear to offset monies obtained through federal 
forfeitures by reducing law enforcement budgets. See Baicker & Jacobson, supra note 62, at 2115, 
2128–29. 
 69. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 131A.365 (2019). 
 70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 20-2-93(e) (2019). 
 71. See, e.g., infra note 162 and accompanying text. Just because local or state law designates 
revenue from economic sanctions for purposes outside of criminal legal systems does not mean 
that funds are so distributed. In some cases, due to a lack of oversight, law enforcement retains 
funds even where required to submit the revenues for other purposes. See Michael D. Makowsky, 
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As a result of the increased variety, scope, and application of 
economic sanctions, lawmakers have been able to tap into a 
multibillion-dollar tax-avoidance mechanism that can be used to fund 
both criminal legal institutions and other public projects. Dependence 
on economic sanctions varies from place to place,72 and the net revenue 
hinges on the resources expended to impose and collect such 
sanctions.73 At the federal level, which relies less heavily on economic 
sanctions, the government collected nearly $8 billion in fines and 
restitution in fiscal year 2017 alone.74 Though transparency and data-
collection issues make it impossible to ascertain exact figures, those 
amounts are dwarfed at the state and local level.75 Forfeiture revenues 
have also exploded in large part due to increased uses of civil 
forfeitures, also known as “civil in rem,” “civil asset,” or 
“administrative” forfeitures. While criminal forfeitures are a 
component of criminal processes and imposed as a part of a sentence 
following conviction,76 civil forfeitures occur when the government files 
an action against a particular piece of property or cash related in some 
manner to alleged criminal activity,77 which it may pursue even without 
securing a conviction for—or even charging anyone with—a crime.78 
Civil forfeiture processes also often shift the burden of proof, requiring 
Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants 
of Law Enforcement, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 191 n.1 (2019). 
 72. See infra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
73. In some jurisdictions, gross revenues are substantially offset by costs related to 
imposition and collections. For example, in-court hearings and jail costs take up $0.41 per $1.00 
collected from fines and fees in New Mexico and Texas, though those figures do not account for 
fines and fees imposed in noncriminal traffic cases for which revenues may be higher and costs 
lower. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 5, 9, 19 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 35 tbl. 8C, https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1081801/download 
[http://perma.cc/25NE-D3MN]. 
75. For example, in fiscal year 2018 Florida courts assessed nearly $1.2 billion in economic 
sanctions, not including forfeiture proceeds. See  FLA. COURT CLERKS & COMPTROLLERS,
CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY: 2018 ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS AND COLLECTIONS REPORT 8, 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.flclerks.com/resource/resmgr/public_documents_/1_final_front_ma 
tter_cover_s.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2GA-DDXW]. 
 76. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39–41 (1995). 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. $124,700, in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 2006). 
Nebraska, New Mexico, and North Carolina do not allow civil forfeiture. See Civil Forfeiture 
Reforms on the State Level, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/activism/legislation/civil-forfeiture-
legislative-highlights [http://perma.cc/27ZV-Y4BW]. 
 78. See, e.g., Christopher Zoukis, Civil Asset Forfeiture: Unfair, Unjust, Un-American, CRIM.
LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2018/feb/16/civil-asset-
forfeiture-unfair-unjust-un-american [http://perma.cc/VPT9-CTCV]. 
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people to prove their innocence to succeed in reclaiming their assets.79 
Further, because there is no constitutionally recognized right to 
counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings,80 individuals are left with the 
option of retaining counsel that may be more expensive than the seized 
cash or property’s value.81 The alternative is to navigate often-
Byzantine forfeiture proceedings on their own.82 Unsurprisingly, many 
civil forfeitures go unchallenged.83 With the expansion of civil 
forfeiture practices, net deposits in federal forfeiture funds reached 
over $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $4.7 billion the following year,84 
and estimates of revenues from state and local forfeiture programs 
place annual intake by the mid-2000s at over $1 billion for drug-related 
forfeitures alone.85 
Though a boon to the government, for people of limited means, 
economic sanctions can have significant, negative short- and long-term 
consequences. Debt from economic sanctions often begets more debt, 
particularly from interest, collections costs, and late-payment fees that 
prevent people from paying down the principal.86 Aggressive collection 
practices include the use of property liens, tax intercepts, wage 
garnishment, driver’s license revocation, probation or parole 
 79. See, e.g., id.
 80. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel does not extend to cases that do not result in a term of incarceration). There may 
be a statutory right to counsel in some cases. For example, federal law allows for the provision of 
counsel if a person is represented in a related criminal matter and requires the provision of 
counsel if the property forfeited is the owner’s primary residence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2018).
 81. Cf. Brian D. Kelly & Maureen Kole, The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel 
Approach, 54 ECON. INQUIRY 558, 573 (2016) (“[I]n Maine, for example, median forfeiture 
ranged from $1,820 to $2,630 per year over the course of 5 years, and in Virginia from $615 to 
$1,289 over the course of 12 years.”).
 82. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 64 (quoting Louis Rulli, University of Pennsylvania clinical 
professor and forfeiture defense attorney, regarding complex affirmative defenses available in 
Philadelphia forfeiture proceedings that are unknown even to most lawyers).
 83. See Sallah et al., supra note 20 (describing a review of nearly 62,000 seizures and noting 
that “[o]nly a sixth of the seizures were legally challenged, in part because of the costs of legal 
action against the government”); Stillman, supra note 64 (reporting that 70 percent of forfeitures 
in Texas are uncontested).
 84. See Kelly & Kole, supra note 81, at 558, 560 tbl. 1& n.6 (documenting that deposits in the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s forfeiture fund reached nearly $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2011 and 
$4.2 billion in fiscal year 2012 and the U.S. Treasury Department’s forfeiture fund totaled $868.1 
million and $516.6 million respectively). 
 85. See id. at 560 n.6 (estimating $934 million in forfeitures at the state and local level in 2007 
but noting that the figures are significantly understated because it is based on limited data that 
does not account for all forfeitures). 
 86. See, e.g., ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 17, at 24–25. 

		



  		
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 1544 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1529
extensions or revocation, and even incarceration.87 Therefore, not only 
do people with unmanageable debt face a decreased ability to pay for 
basic human needs such as housing, food, and medical care, but 
governmental collection efforts can also exacerbate that instability. For 
example, the administrative difficulties caused by wage garnishment 
processes may make employers reluctant to hire people with ongoing 
debt,88 and the revocation of a driver’s license can make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain or maintain employment or meet necessary 
obligations required for successful completion of probation or parole.89 
Because forfeitures typically involve the seizure of cash or property, 
they do not create ongoing debt in the same manner as other forms of 
economic sanctions, but they still bear serious consequences for people 
whose assets have been seized. The loss of one’s home, automobile, 
business equipment, and more can interfere with a person’s ability to 
participate in the labor market or access educational services, meet 
basic human needs, maintain family and social stability, and satisfy 
other legal obligations.90 
In light of these potential repercussions, there have been 
increasing calls to graduate economic sanctions to account for a 
person’s financial circumstances. In some jurisdictions, the possibility 
of graduation has existed for some time, because relevant laws have 
either required or allowed judges to waive or lower the amount of fines, 
fees, or surcharges imposed.91 These laws often provide little guidance, 
 87. COLO. OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, VICTIM’S RESTITUTION: THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH & DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE AUDIT 8–9, 23–25 (2014), 
https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/audits/2197p-victimsrestitutionapril2014. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/KHJ8-LQ5D]; CAROLINE HOLLINGSWORTH, ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., FINE 
COLLECTION SEMINAR & GUIDEBOOK 6, 11–15, 19–20 (3d ed. 2019), https://www.arcounties.org/ 
site/assets/files/4985/finecollectionguidebook2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6UU-AQKC];
MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 21. 
 88. Cf. Julie Farraj, Here Are the 4 Things Employers Must Know About Wage Garnishment, 
WORKFORCE.COM (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.workforce.com/2017/02/15/4-things-employers-
must-know-wage-garnishment [https://perma.cc/K3U6-59C8] (warning of legal and financial 
consequences of hiring an employee subject to wage garnishment). 
 89. See, e.g., ALAN M. VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR. & N.J. MOTOR VEHICLE COMM’N, MOTOR 
VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 38 (2006), 
https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/about/AFTF_final_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EW6-QKJK]
(detailing the implications of driver’s license suspensions, including that 42 percent of people lost 
employment, of whom 45 percent remained unemployed, and of the remaining 55 percent, the 
vast majority only found employment at reduced-income levels); cf. Colgan & McLean, supra
note 26, at 431, 446–47 (noting the difficulties that loss of access to transportation can cause for 
attending probation and parole meetings).
 90. Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 437–47. 
 91. See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text. 

		



  		
 
    
  
 
     
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
  
 2020] BEYOND GRADUATION 1545
however, on how to determine a person’s ability to pay, and in some 
cases may simply be ignored.92 Further, relevant laws typically prohibit 
the graduation of one or more types of economic sanctions, including, 
in most jurisdictions, restitution.93 Similarly, forfeiture statutes also 
customarily make no allowances for graduation of cash or property 
forfeitures.94 A push to improve graduation mechanisms where they do 
exist, and to create such systems where they do not, has come from two 
sources. First, public consternation regarding the poor treatment of 
people of limited means brought to light by advocates and investigative 
journalists in recent years has led to successful efforts to reform the 
law.95 Second, an increasing number of state and federal courts have 
found that considering the financial effect of economic sanctions prior 
to their imposition is constitutionally required.96 
Graduation mechanisms may vary from location to location, but 
they share a central goal of ensuring that economic sanctions do not 
place people and their families in a state of fiscal instability that 
undermines access to basic human needs and from which it would be 
difficult to recover. Although graduation mechanisms generally 
involve a determination of a person’s income, if any, offset by a series 
of deductions for expenses related to basic needs of the person and his 
or her family,97 the manner in which such information is used to reduce 
 92. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 42, at 44, 53 (regarding the municipal court’s “legally 
inadequate” failure to consider ability to pay despite a state statutory requirement); supra notes 
23–24 and accompanying text. 
 93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.051(c) (2019) (allowing reductions in other economic 
sanctions but not restitution). 
 94. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4702 (2019). 
 95. See, e.g., Jeffrey Selbin, Juvenile Fee Abolition in California: Early Lessons and 
Challenges for the Debt Free Justice Movement, 98 N.C. L. REV. 401, 403–12 (2020) (describing 
efforts by advocates to eliminate the use of fees in California’s juvenile courts); Stillman, supra
note 64 (investigating civil forfeiture practices); see also generally  THOMAS HARVEY ET AL.,
ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER (2014), 
https://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-
Courts-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/V76N-G7FZ]. 
 96. See, e.g., Colo. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t v. Dami Hosp., 442 P.3d 94, 102 (Colo. 2019) 
(“[C]ourts considering whether a fine is constitutionally excessive should consider ability to pay 
in making that assessment.”); State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 34–35 (Ind. 2019) (holding that a 
subjective inquiry into the financial effect of an automobile forfeiture was necessary for 
application of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause). 
 97. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., SF LOCAL FORM TR-320/CR-320: SAN 
FRANCISCO SUPERIOR COURT: CAN’T AFFORD TO PAY FINE: TRAFFIC AND OTHER 
INFRACTIONS (2018), https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/images/GJ%20Imgs/ 
San%20Francisco%20corrected%20ATP%20Form%20111418.pdf?1573867133300 [http://perma.cc/
R4PD-9PFV].
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economic sanctions may take different forms. For example, in 2018, the 
City and County of San Francisco adopted a system by which the fines 
and fees that would otherwise be imposed for traffic offenses are 
reduced by 80 percent for any person determined to be under 250 
percent of the federal poverty level or who receives means-tested 
public benefits.98 Rather than using a flat cutoff, lawmakers might also 
adopt a more granular approach that allows for reduction or waiver of 
economic sanctions based on a person’s specific economic 
circumstances, as both Kentucky and Texas did in 2017.99 Another 
possible approach involves “day-fines,” a form of graduation used in 
some European and Latin American countries under which offenses 
are assigned a penalty unit based on the seriousness of the offense; that 
penalty unit is then multiplied by the person’s adjusted daily income to 
reach an amount of economic sanctions that is responsive to both the 
nature of the offense and the person’s financial circumstances.100 
Similar systems could be employed with respect to cash forfeitures. 
Property forfeitures would likely require a slightly different approach, 
whereby courts would determine how the loss of the property at issue 
would affect a person’s financial condition. For example, a portion of 
the proceeds from the government’s sale of a forfeited home may need 
to be returned to ensure a person and his or her family can still 
maintain stable, alternative housing.101 
Graduation, therefore, has great potential to make criminal legal 
systems fairer and more equitable at the individual level. The question 
that remains, however, is whether graduation supports or undermines 
the possibility of broader structural reform, particularly given the 
economic stakes for criminal legal actors and policymakers. This 
Article turns to that question next, using abolitionism as a lens through 
which to critically assess graduation.
II. GRADUATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THROUGH AN 
ABOLITIONIST LENS
To understand how abolitionism can operate as a critical lens for 
assessing the efficacy of graduating economic sanctions, it is essential 
 98. See Can’t Afford To Pay, SUPERIOR CT. CAL., COUNTY S.F., 
https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/divisions/traffic/cant-afford-pay [https://perma.cc/CKN2-X8UJ].
 99. See 2017 KY. ACTS 1166; 2017 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3966; 2017 TEX. GEN. LAWS 4317. 
 100. See Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 25, at 56–57. 
 101. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 437–38. 

		



  		
 
    
 
 
  
   
   
 
  
   
 
    
  
  
   
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2020] BEYOND GRADUATION 1547
to first articulate its bounds.102 Modern abolitionists intentionally use 
the word “abolition” as a direct link to the movement in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries to abolish slavery for two reasons. First, the 
term is adopted in recognition of the original abolitionists’ audacity of 
imagining a world without the enslavement of people and the ultimate 
achievement of that goal in the United States, which provides hope and 
guidance for attaining the type of fundamental societal transformation 
modern abolitionists seek.103 Second, modern abolitionists center their 
advocacy on the historical relationship between the end of slavery and 
the modern carceral state104—from the Black Codes and convict-
leasing systems that effectively reenslaved people in the 
Reconstruction Era South,105 to the racialization of crime policy and 
policing practices in the North and West as African Americans fled Jim 
Crow laws during the Great Migration,106 to crime policy leading out of 
the Civil Rights Era,107 to the way in which the legacy of generational 
economic deprivation still leaves African Americans in economically 
depressed, heavily policed communities today.108 As Saidiya Hartman 
has written, understanding that historical relationship is critical 
“because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus 
and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is 
102. For a more robust description of abolitionism than can be offered here, see Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The Supreme Court 2018 Term: Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 3–49 (2019). 
 103. See, e.g., DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 22–25; Patrisse Cullors, 
Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1685 (2019). 
 104. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 102, at 7, 19–42, 48–49. 
 105. See DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 25–39. For a detailed history of 
the use of Black Codes and convict leasing, see generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY 
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL 
WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); SARAH HALEY, NO MERCY HERE: GENDER, PUNISHMENT,
AND THE MAKING OF JIM CROW MODERNITY (2016); and TALITHA L. LEFLOURIA, CHAINED 
IN SILENCE: BLACK WOMEN AND CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (2015). For a historical 
account of the use of convict leasing in what would become California, see generally KELLY 
LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE OF HUMAN 
CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965 (2017).
 106. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS:
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (documenting racialized 
social and criminal justice policies beyond the Jim Crow South).
 107. See generally HINTON, supra note 50 (disproving the idea that the “War on Crime” began 
in the Reagan Era by documenting policies dating back to the 1960s).
 108. See Geoff Ward, The Square One Project Roundtable on the Future of Justice Policy: 
Recognition, Reparation, and the Reconstruction of ‘Square One’ (unpublished manuscript at 2– 
4), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b4cc00c710699c57a454b25/t/5c9296af6e9a7f21d3d95f 
40/1553110703340/Ward+%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H6U-W5EU].
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the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances, limited access to health 
and education, premature death, incarceration, and 
impoverishment.”109 
Even with a common grounding in historical abolition efforts, 
defining the bounds of the modern movement is somewhat fraught 
because—like all social movements110—abolitionism exists on a 
spectrum.111 In particular, despite its importance, the link to abolition 
in the context of slavery—in other words, the total elimination of the 
institution—does not fully capture the range of positions that people 
who identify as “abolitionists” embrace today. To be sure, there are 
abolitionists that believe in the immediate and total elimination of 
prisons and policing full stop.112 Others call for “the complete and utter 
dismantling of prisons, policing, and surveillance as they currently exist 
within our culture,”113 leaving the door open for intermediate system 
reforms short of that goal until it can be reached. Still others explicitly 
accept that there may be circumstances under which people should be 
subject to some form of confinement for a limited time, albeit under 
conditions that would be unrecognizable when compared to such 
institutions today.114 
 109. SAIDIYA HARTMAN, LOSE YOUR MOTHER: A JOURNEY ALONG THE ATLANTIC SLAVE 
ROUTE 6 (2007). 
 110. See, e.g., Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Five Years Later, Do Black Lives Matter?, JACOBIN
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/black-lives-matter-laquan-mcdonald-
mike-brown-eric-garner [https://perma.cc/VZ3E-AM9H] (documenting the development of the 
Movement for Black Lives and how “movement participants come to radically different 
conclusions about what the objective should be”). 
 111. See Roberts, supra note 102, at 6 (“It is hard to pin down what prison abolition means.”).
 112. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 108, at 3 (noting “growing and compelling calls for a society 
without police or prisons”). 
 113. See Episode 29—Mariame Kaba at 34:30, AIRGO (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://airgoradio.com/airgo/2016/2/2/episode-29-mariame-kaba (emphasis added) 
[https://perma.cc/W9ZS-DETN]; see also Mariame Kaba, Take No Prisoners, VICE (Oct. 5, 2015, 
12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/vdxpp4/mending-our-ways-0000775-v22n10 
[https://perma.cc/C6PX-GANB] (“When I speak of abolition, I don’t demand the immediate 
closing of all correctional facilities . . . . Part of our work, then, must be to create the conditions 
necessary to ensure the possibility of a world without prisons.”); End the War on Black People, 
MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people 
[https://perma.cc/XS8U-CJ2M] (“Until we achieve a world where cages are no longer used against 
our people we demand an immediate change in conditions and an end to all jails, detention 
centers, youth facilities and prisons as we know them.” (emphasis added)). 
 114. See, e.g., KNOPP ET AL., supra note 35, at 19–20, 129–30; see also id. at 36 (“Tho[ugh] 
some advocate abolishing the criminal law, for the present most abolitionists advocate limiting 
criminal law to reduce its discriminatory and arbitrary powers and its extended use as a tool of 
socialization.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Yet, even across this spectrum of beliefs, abolitionists share an 
insistence on replacing the carceral state—“the country’s vast 
archipelago of jails and prisons, [and] the far-reaching and growing 
range of penal punishments and controls that lies in the never-never 
land between the prison gate and full citizenship”115—with 
interventions that address complex social issues related to inequality 
including poverty, health, and structural racism.116 The reach of the 
carceral state that abolitionists challenge includes abusive practices 
related to economic sanctions.117 
Abolitionism’s insistence on reimagining societal structures is 
what makes it a particularly potent tool for assessing proposed reforms, 
whether one agrees with abolitionist principles or not.118 Though the 
audacity of these goals lead people to discount abolitionists as 
“utopians and idealists whose ideas are at best unrealistic and 
impracticable, and, at worst, mystifying and foolish,”119 it is that very 
resolve to achieve radical societal transformation that provides a 
fundamentally different benchmark, the application of which may 
reveal that a promising reform actually risks “a new round of damaging 
controls, inflicted upon an even greater number of citizens.”120 
This Article, therefore, takes two key questions from abolitionism 
to assess graduation of economic sanctions as a reform, each tethered 
to the ultimate goal of broad structural change: first, whether 
graduation aids in dismantling, rather than perpetuating, the carceral 
state; and second, whether it supports the replacement of current 
criminal legal processes with systems of “transformative justice.”121 
 115. MARIE  GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2015). 
 116. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 107–08; McLeod, Envisioning 
Abolition Democracy, supra note 31, at 1616. Some abolitionists understand this shift to represent 
a rejection of capitalism in favor of other forms of governance such as a socialist democracy. See, 
e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS & EDUARDO MENDIETA, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE,
PRISONS, AND TORTURE 21, 68, 99 (2005). 
 117. See Elizabeth Jones, Racism, Fines and Fees and the US Carceral State, RACE & CLASS, 
Jan.–Mar. 2018, at 43 (arguing that the carceral state must be understood to include the use of 
economic sanctions); End the War on Black People, supra note 113 (calling for a prohibition on 
“mandatory fines, fees, court surcharges and ‘defendant funded’ court proceedings”).
 118. See infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
 119. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 9–10. 
 120. See KNOPP ET AL., supra note 35, at 20. 
 121. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Abolitionism could be used to assess 
ungraduated economic sanctions against the vision of a diminished carceral state and expansion 
of transformative justice. The analysis here is distinct from such an inquiry, however, due to the 
way graduation pushes revenue streams up and down, which may then have unique consequences 
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A. Goal One: Dismantle the Carceral State 
To assess whether a policy aids in dismantling the carceral state, 
abolitionists distinguish between reforms that “diminish [the] power 
and function”122 of criminal legal systems and mere technocratic 
reforms that may provide relief in individual cases but also entrench or 
legitimize such systems.123 In undertaking such an assessment, 
abolitionists have insisted on attending to the ways in which criminal 
legal processes are tied to economic policy, and how policymakers may 
be influenced by the system’s capacity to “generate huge profits from 
processes of social destruction.”124 
By reducing economic sanctions to a manageable amount, 
graduation certainly provides individual relief. Not only does 
graduation alleviate the financial burdens of the punishment, it also 
significantly reduces the likelihood that the negative consequences of 
nonpayment may accrue.125 The question is whether that individual 
relief is consistent with the goal of dismantling the carceral state or in 
opposition to it. 
Decreasing the amount of fines, fees, and surcharges imposed may 
diminish the scope of the carceral state by limiting the duration of time 
that people fall under its thumb. For example, a typical condition of 
probation or parole includes the payment of economic sanctions.126 
Though constitutionally dubious, in many jurisdictions people may be 
subject to continued supervision because of unsettled economic 
sanctions they have no meaningful ability to pay.127 By reducing the 
economic sanctions imposed to a manageable amount, people are able 
to satisfy their conditions of supervision more quickly, thereby 
shrinking the number of people subject to carceral control. Similarly, 
for both abolitionist aims. See infra notes 131–36, 160–61 and accompanying text. Graduation also 
raises specific concerns about how it may be used to legitimize restitution practices that actually 
do little to aid many crime survivors. See infra notes 170–90, 196–209 and accompanying text. 
 122. KNOPP ET AL., supra note 35, at 7; see also Roberts, supra note 102, at 42–43 (“[R]eforms 
that correct problems perceived as aberrational flaws in the system only help to legitimize and 
strengthen its operation.”). 
 123. See, e.g., About, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/RHW3-LTE7] (“Because we seek to abolish the [Prison Industrial Complex], 
we cannot support any work that extends its life or scope.”). 
 124. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 88. 
 125. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of 
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 314 (2016). 
 127. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 
77–79 (2019) [hereinafter Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement]. 
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eligibility for record sealing and expungement128—often critical for 
one’s ability to obtain housing and employment129—as well as 
restoration of voting rights130 often hinges on full payment of economic 
sanctions. Therefore, by making it more feasible for people to 
complete payment, these individuals can more readily extricate 
themselves from the grip of the carceral state.
The graduation of forfeitures to account for their effect on fiscal 
and social well-being, if implemented, would also help diminish 
criminal legal systems by depleting a source of their funding. As noted 
above, in the majority of jurisdictions, proceeds from forfeitures accrue 
in whole or in part to law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies.131 
Graduating forfeitures to account for financial effect, however, 
disrupts that flow of cash and property. For example, if police in 
Hawaii seize a vehicle suspected of being used in a drug transaction, 
lawmakers allow the police to retain one-quarter of the proceeds from 
the vehicle’s sale, distribute another quarter to the prosecutor, and 
award the remaining half to the Hawaii Attorney General’s office for 
law enforcement purposes.132 Were Hawaii to adopt a program for 
graduating the forfeiture to account for the owner’s financial and social 
well-being, the government may be limited to retaining a smaller 
portion of the vehicle’s value, returning the remainder to the owner to 
obtain a different vehicle to attend work or school, medical visits, and 
the like.133 In so doing, monies available to fund key actors who 
maintain the carceral state—particularly law enforcement and 
prosecution—are necessarily reduced. 
Other potential outcomes of graduation, however, undermine 
abolitionist goals by entrenching, or even supporting the expansion of, 
the carceral apparatus. Perhaps surprisingly—unlike forfeitures—the 
 128. See, e.g., Katie Rose Quandt, The Largest Commutation in U.S. History, SLATE (Nov. 8, 
2019, 3:51 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/oklahoma-clemency-drug-criminal-
justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/75LV-WF7R] (reporting that expungement fees in 
Oklahoma are approximately $340 and that expungement is unavailable unless a person pays off 
all court debt). 
 129. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An 
Empirical Study, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, 41–53), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353620 [https://perma.cc/DY3F-ELCC] (finding that criminal record 
expungement resulted in greater likelihood of being employed at all and of earning greater 
wages). 
 130. See Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, supra note 127, at 65–86. 
 131. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
 132. HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-16(2)–(4) (2019). 
 133. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 448. 
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graduation of fines, fees, and surcharges downward to a manageable 
amount may actually bolster funding for criminal legal systems and 
therefore support or even expand upon the status quo. Experience with 
graduation in the United States suggests that when people are faced 
with unmanageable economic sanctions, they are less likely to pay than 
if sanctions are graduated.134 Therefore, even though graduation 
reduces the amount imposed, collections—and, by extension, funding 
to support criminal legal systems—are likely to rise. Absent 
graduation, existing structures for the use of economic sanction 
revenues do transform people subjected to policing and prosecution 
“into sources of profit.”135 With graduation, those same people may 
become unwilling participants into the system’s continuation and 
expansion as collections increase.136 
A key risk of improved collections that may result from graduating 
fines, fees, and surcharges is that graduation will disincentivize 
lawmakers from engaging in critical examination of the scope and 
severity of criminal legal systems, something Karin Martin has 
described as “monetary myopia.”137 In other words, if a lawmaker is 
reliant on those revenues, she may be less like to consider crime policy 
on a larger scale, including whether a particular type of activity should 
be legalized, whether sentences should be reduced, how policing 
should be regulated, or the extent to which managing social problems 
through criminal legal systems creates harm. 
Increasingly, studies suggest that lawmakers and system actors are 
in fact influenced, at least in part,138 by the revenue-generating capacity 
of economic sanctions. For example, researchers have linked increased 
traffic ticketing to both budgetary shortfalls139 and statutory limitations 
 134. See COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 25, at 17–18 & box 
4; Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 25, at 65–69; Tex. Office of Court Admin., 
Indicators of Impact of Fines, Fees & Court Costs Legislation, https://www.txcourts.gov/ 
media/1442212/ff-indicators.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9CY-VEHK] (presenting data showing that 
collections per case rose in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 following passage of reforms allowing 
reduction of fines and fees to account for ability to pay).
 135. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 88. 
 136. Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1059 
(2015) (critiquing policy changes that would replace criminal punishments with civil fines because
“we risk turning the most vulnerable population into funding fodder for the very institution from 
which we are trying to protect them”). 
 137. Martin, supra note 51, at 633 (defining “monetary myopia” as “a short-sighted focus on 
revenue at the expense of considering other important, competing concerns”).
 138. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
139. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal 
Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 83–87 & tbl.2 (2009); Michael 
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on other mechanisms for generating revenue such as property tax 
caps.140 Lawmakers may even write revenue increases into budget 
forecasts, leaving solvency dependent on an uptick in offenses—or the 
policing of offenses—that can lead to the imposition of economic 
sanctions.141 The system, therefore, becomes self-perpetuating: reliance 
on economic sanctions leads to a need for law enforcement to police 
offenses that are revenue generating, courts to impose such sanctions, 
and an administrative apparatus to collect revenues, which leads to 
greater dependence on economic sanctions.142 In other words, 
increased revenues resulting from the graduation of economic 
sanctions may lead to greater entrenchment or expansion of existing 
systems, to the detriment of critical examination of the breadth and 
consequences of the criminal law.
Monetary myopia may be particularly difficult to disrupt because 
people most often subjected to the laws and enforcement practices 
have reduced political power. For example, a study of traffic ticketing 
in North Carolina revealed that even though ticketing generally 
increased in relation to economic downturns, reliance on ticketing 
could be reduced with even “marginal increases” in a community’s 
political participation, suggesting that system actors were reticent to 
engage in revenue-generating practices in communities where they 
may encounter meaningful political pushback.143 Stated differently, 
revenue goals and political economy alone cannot explain current 
D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic 
Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 509, 511 (2009).
140. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 139, at 510–12, 526. 
 141. See, e.g., Garrett & Wagner, supra note 139, at 72 (describing how Nashville’s mayor 
“included a 33 percent increase in traffic ticket revenue” in a proposed budget); see also Martin, 
supra note 51, at 643 (quoting Stephen Dahl, President of the Nevada Judges Association, 
describing a policy by which funding for Nevada’s courts is dependent upon collections from 
economic sanctions as follows: “The policy subconsciously hopes for more crime. A good year in 
raising administrative assessment fees is a year when the crime rate goes up; a bad year is when 
the crime rate goes down. Success in raising administrative assessment fees depends in large part 
on our failure to prevent crime.”). 
 142. See Martin, supra note 51, at 634–35. 
143. Garrett & Wagner, supra note 139, at 86; see also William E. Crozier & Brandon L. 
Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North 
Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585 (2020). Another recent study suggests that in at least some areas, 
law enforcement targets out-of-jurisdiction drivers—those who do not vote in the area 
patrolled—for traffic stops that lead to economic sanctions. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas 
Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 
J.L. & ECON. 863, 865 (2011) [hereinafter Makowsky & Stratmann, More Tickets]; see also
Stillman, supra note 64 (detailing practices in Tenaha, Texas, by which law enforcement and 
prosecutors worked together to target out-of-town drivers). 
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practices; if they did, one would expect law enforcement and 
prosecutors to focus their efforts toward wealthier communities where 
the ability to pay economic sanctions is higher and property forfeitures 
are more lucrative. Instead, it is low-income communities and people 
of color who are more likely to be heavily policed, including for drug 
and public-order offenses that carry mandatory fines or where 
economic sanctions are the primary form of punishment.144 Such 
communities face uniquely high barriers to political participation. Not 
only are people who are directly disenfranchised as the result of a 
conviction blocked from voting,145 studies also show that 
disenfranchisement practices reduce voter turnout in African 
American communities broadly.146 There is also significant evidence 
that mere exposure to criminal legal systems via the arrest or 
incarceration of family members or from one’s own jailing for 
nondisenfranchising misdemeanor offenses leads to decreased political 
 144. See, e.g., MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 13; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS &
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 72 (2017), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/ 
Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/77MS-9BXE]; Selbin, supra note 95, 
at 407–08 (finding that juveniles of color and their families are more likely to be subject to 
economic sanctions than their white counterparts); Noli Brazil, The Unequal Spatial Distribution 
of City Government Fines: The Case of Parking Tickets in Los Angeles, URB. AFF. REV., June 
2018, at 19–26 (finding that the number of parking tickets issued in Los Angeles is higher in 
neighborhoods with black residents). 
This is not to say that lawmakers do not also have public safety interests in mind. Economic 
sanctions constitute the primary punishment, for example, for traffic offenses typically designed 
to protect motorist and pedestrian safety. See, e.g., Marsh & Gerrick, supra note 25, at 115–16. 
But even where such proper motives exist, enforcement may still be disproportionately targeted 
at politically vulnerable communities. See, e.g., Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, 
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings [https://perma.cc/GXC9-UFV3] (analyzing nearly 100 
million traffic stops and concluding that officers are more likely to stop African American drivers 
than white drivers, and more likely to issue speeding tickets to African American and Latinx 
drivers than white drivers). Further, that lawmakers may intend economic sanctions to promote 
public safety does not mean they do a good job at doing so. For example, although one recent 
study has found that an increase in traffic tickets reduces the number of traffic accidents, 
Makowsky & Stratmann, More Tickets, supra note 143, at 863, 883, a separate study has linked 
policies that allow law enforcement to retain forfeiture proceeds to increased traffic fatalities, 
Kantor et al., supra note 63, at 34, 36.
 145. See, e.g., Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case 
of Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312, 327–28 (2017); State-by-State Data: 
Felony Disenfranchisement Rate, SENT’G PROJECT (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-
facts/#map?dataset-option=FDR [https://perma.cc/SW6M-98BU] (comparing, for each state, the 
disenfranchisement rate of the total population with that of African Americans). 
 146. See, e.g., Melanie Bowers & Robert R. Preuhs, Collateral Consequences of a Collateral 
Penalty: The Negative Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on the Political Participation of 
Nonfelons, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 722, 738, 740 (2009) (finding that disenfranchisement “policies tend to 
dampen the probability of voting for blacks, but not for non-Hispanic whites”). 
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participation.147 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, a recent study analyzing 
data on over nine thousand cities found that separate and apart from 
budgetary needs, municipalities are more likely to rely on revenue 
from fines and fees as the percentage of black residents increases.148 
Put simply, shifting the baseline of the analysis from the individual 
benefits of graduation to focus on the long-term goal of structural 
transformation reveals that graduation might aid in shrinking the 
carceral state. However, the contradictory consequence is that 
increased collections resulting from graduation may make it less likely 
lawmakers will critically examine the scope and harshness of existing 
criminal legal systems. 
B. Goal Two: Create Systems of Transformative Justice 
For abolitionists, it is not enough to merely dismantle the carceral 
state; it is equally important to replace it with systems of transformative 
justice. Within this concept of transformative justice are two 
interrelated goals: building more equitable communities149 and creating 
systems to respond to incidents where people commit harm to others 
or the community that focus on accountability and community well-
being rather than punishment.150 
1. Build a More Equitable Society. Within abolitionism, building a 
more equitable society involves “the creation of an array of social 
institutions that would begin to solve the social problems that set 
people on the track to prison, thereby helping to render the prison 
obsolete.”151 Over time, access to supportive services in economically 
fragile communities—particularly chemical dependency and mental 
health treatment, employment training, and the like—have become 
intertwined with the carceral state, with such services at times primarily 
 147. See, e.g., Hedwig Lee, Lauren C. Porter & Megan Comfort, Consequences of Family 
Member Incarceration: Impacts on Civic Participation and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and 
Fairness of Government, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 44, 53 (2014) (finding that 
people who experienced the incarceration of a parent during childhood were less likely to vote 
and more likely to distrust the government); Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The
Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 311, 315–21 
(2019) (finding that short jail sentences for misdemeanor offenses depress voting in the next 
election for black, but not white, voters). 
148. Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive 
Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090, 1091–92 (2017). 
 149. GENERATION FIVE, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
 150. Id.; McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 31, at 1646.
 151. DAVIS & MENDIETA, supra note 116, at 96. 
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or exclusively accessible through contact with criminal legal systems.152
For example, community mental health services are largely unavailable 
to people of limited means, whereas the three largest mental health 
systems in the United States are now inside jails.153 Abolitionists hold 
that a more rational and moral approach is to replace incarceration and 
other mechanisms of punishment that do a poor job in deterring 
crime154 with structures that improve economic and social well-being 
and allow people and their communities to flourish. Such programs 
may include, for example, community-based health services, increased 
support of public education programs, investments in job training and 
support, urban redevelopment, and access to affordable housing.155 
This idea is supported by available research, which indicates “that 
states and countries that spend more on social welfare tend to have 
lower incarceration rates, and [that] high rates of inequality are 
associated with higher rates of imprisonment and higher rates of 
crime.”156 
Graduation of economic sanctions appears consistent with this 
goal because it is designed to promote financial stability for people and 
their families. The basic premise behind graduation is that ensuring 
that economic sanctions are manageable—meaning payable in a 
limited time period and at an amount that does not preclude a person 
from meeting basic needs—can have significant positive benefits for 
people subjected to criminal legal systems and their families.157 By 
reducing or even eliminating failures to pay due to inability, graduation 
not only improves financial stability in comparison to ungraduated 
sanctions but also decreases the risk of downstream consequences that 
further impede a person’s financial and social well-being, such as 
nonpayment penalties, wage garnishment, and driver’s license 
 152. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 115, at 46; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 153. See, e.g., Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Realized, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 
2013, 2:47 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/20/kennedys-vision-
mental-health/3100001 [https://perma.cc/BWR5-3NKJ]. 
154. Mariame Kaba & Kelly Hayes, Opinion, A Jailbreak of the Imagination: Seeing Prisons 
for What They Are and Demanding Transformation, TRUTHOUT (May 3, 2018), 
https://truthout.org/articles/a-jailbreak-of-the-imagination-seeing-prisons-for-what-they-are-
and-demanding-transformation [https://perma.cc/CP8G-8GB4]. 
 155. See DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 20–21, 107–08; DAVIS &
MENDIETA, supra note 116, at 99; Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 
62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1158–61 (2015); see also infra notes 273–79 and accompanying text. 
 156. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 115, at 279; see also infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
 157. See COLGAN, Addressing Modern Debtors’ Prisons, supra note 25, at 6–12. 
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revocations.158 Similarly, attending to the real-world effects of cash and 
property forfeitures helps ensure that people are not stripped of 
shelter, transportation, and other property needed to function within 
society.159 
In many jurisdictions, graduation may also contribute to this aim 
if revenues do increase and those funds are used to support social 
services rather than funding criminal legal systems. Funds generated 
through payment of economic sanctions are, for example, used to fund 
schools, infrastructure projects, city parks, and more.160 Therefore, if 
more money is generated from graduated economic sanctions, and 
used exclusively for such programs, the reform would contribute to 
community development. 
Once again, though, graduation may simultaneously cut against 
abolitionist goals. Graduation will not always result in revenue 
increases. As noted above, the graduation of forfeitures is a one-way 
ratchet by which money or property is returned to the owner, thus 
reducing the amount accruing to the government.161 In other words, 
systems for graduating forfeitures reduce the amount of funding that 
could be diverted to social welfare programs.
Further, graduation does not address a deeper issue of inequity 
that may exist even when revenues are put toward social welfare 
spending. In many jurisdictions, funds obtained through economic 
sanctions, and not used to fund criminal legal processes, are placed into 
the jurisdiction’s general fund to be distributed jurisdiction wide. For 
example, under New Mexico law, all fines and forfeitures collected 
pursuant to the state’s general laws must be placed in its Current 
School Fund.162 In turn, monies from the fund are distributed to public 
schools under a formula that looks to student enrollment, as well as a 
series of multipliers related to data such as the number of special 
education or ESL students in the student body.163 There is no 
consideration of what community the funds originated from in the 
 158. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 437–47.
 160. See, e.g., Prisoners of Debt: Justice System Imposes Steep Fines, Fees, supra note 58; supra
notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 131–133 and accompanying text. 
 162. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-32(A)(1) (2019). 
 163. N.M. LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., FINANCE FACTS: PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING FORMULA 
1 (2019), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Entity/LFC/Documents/Finance_Facts/finance%20facts%20public 
%20school%20funding%20formula.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GGX-LT46]. 
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distribution scheme.164 This effectively means that communities that 
are more heavily policed are subjected to a tax that other communities 
do not have to bear, thus increasing rather than abating societal 
inequities.165 
In sum, graduation may simultaneously raise (by application to 
fines, fees, and surcharges) and lower (by application to forfeiture) 
revenues that could be used to fund social welfare programs. It also
does nothing to mandate revenue redistribution from criminal legal 
systems to supportive social services or to reform systems that 
distribute revenues jurisdiction wide. As with its role in dismantling the 
carceral state, when its potential effects on the development of a more 
equitable society are considered, the efficacy of graduation is mixed.
2. Respond to Violations of the Law by Promoting Accountability 
and Community Well-Being. Though abolitionists posit that the 
development of structures that create more equitable societies will 
reduce crime, they also acknowledge that at times, people will still 
engage in acts that harm others or the community. A system of 
transformative justice would center responses to such transgressions on 
achieving accountability and community well-being through 
“reparation and reconciliation rather than retribution and 
vengeance.”166 
For those faced with economic sanctions, a well-designed 
graduation mechanism167 fits with the transformative justice goal of 
promoting community well-being. Namely, it protects community 
members by offering an individualized assessment intended to ensure 
that the real-world consequences of the sanctions—such as what it 
would mean for a family to lose a vehicle they depend on to attend 
work or school or to access child or medical care—are taken into 
account.168 
The thornier question is whether graduation promotes the well-
being of all community members given its potential implications for the 
availability of monetary restitution for crime survivors. Any 
 164. Id.
 165. See Martin, supra note 51, at 645–49 (describing Iowa’s practice of depositing economic 
sanction revenues in its general fund for state-wide distribution as a hidden form of taxation).
 166. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 107; see also KNOPP ET AL., supra
note 35, at 22, 114–18; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 181, 186–91 (1990). 
 167. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 440–47. 
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meaningful system would require the graduation of restitution to 
ensure that the entire package of economic sanctions imposed is at a 
manageable amount in circumstances where a court orders the 
payment of restitution directly to the survivor (“direct restitution”) and 
would reduce the availability of forfeiture proceeds for distribution to 
survivors (“proceeds-based restitution”).169 
While abolitionism shifts the baseline against which graduation 
should be measured away from the status quo, understanding the 
stated rationale for restitution in existing criminal legal systems— 
making survivors whole170—and how that framing pits survivors against 
those upon whom restitution is imposed provides useful context. 
Because graduation may reduce monies awarded to survivors, its 
application to restitution has been a political nonstarter.171 Though 
graduation of direct restitution to an affordable amount may lead to 
increased collections,172 and thus more money available to pay 
survivors, graduation necessarily places the sanction imposed below a 
survivor’s losses. Further, graduation of forfeitures necessarily reduces 
the amount of revenue available for proceeds-based restitution.173 
Therefore, graduation has either been adopted in situations where 
restitution would never be awarded, such as for traffic offenses,174 or 
where lawmakers have explicitly excluded restitution from graduation 
programs, treating it as off-limits.175 
Whether graduation pushes funds available for restitution higher 
or lower, by treating restitution as sacrosanct within the development 
of graduation mechanisms, policymakers avoid a greater truth: the 
claim that restitution makes survivors whole is a lie.176 It is absolutely 
the case that having access to money can be critically important to 
survivors, who may need financial assistance to obtain medical or 
 169. See, e.g., supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 170. Lollar, supra note 54, at 97. 
171. The graduation of restitution, however, may be constitutionally required. See Colgan, 
Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 26, at 41–46 (describing indications that the 
Supreme Court may treat restitution as a “fine” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s 
excessive fines clause); see also supra note 26. 
 172. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 176. Cf. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A 
ROAD TO REPAIR 41 (2019) (discussing how pretending that incarceration will help victims is 
“unethical” in light of the dearth of evidence that incarceration aids in alleviating trauma or in 
encouraging rehabilitation and safety).
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mental health care, move to a safer location, and otherwise address 
their trauma and safety concerns.177 The inability to access necessary 
funds is particularly problematic because survivors are 
disproportionately low-income individuals, and therefore their 
financial losses are especially devastating and needs especially acute.178 
But the Supreme Court has recognized what criminal legal system 
actors know to be true: imposing direct restitution on a person who 
cannot pay “will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”179 Given 
rates of indigency for those subjected to prosecution,180 it is 
unsurprising that direct restitution arrears are at over $110 billion at 
the federal level ($100 billion of which the government believes is 
uncollectable),181 and arrears are likely in the billions more at the local 
and state level.182 Further, even when direct restitution is paid it is often 
at a trickle over time, doing little to help survivors when the loss 
occurs.183 
Existing proceeds-based restitution practices fare no better under 
scrutiny than direct restitution. The federal government uses a portion 
of forfeiture proceeds to pay survivors of associated crimes184 and also 
to finance the national Crime Victims Fund program, which is broken 
into separate funds managed by all fifty states.185 State lawmakers, 
 177. See id. at 28. 
 178. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 4 (2016), 
https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Survivors% 
20Speak%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B94Y-FDEQ]; ERIKA HARRELL, LYNN LANGTON,
MARCUS BERZOFSKY, LANCE COUZENS & HOPE SMILEY-MCDONALD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD POVERTY AND NONFATAL VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 2008–2012, at 2 
(2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hpnvv0812.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LBL-79KP]. 
179. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983) (holding that automatic revocation of 
probation for nonpayment of economic sanctions violates equal protection and due process).
 180. ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 5 (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/publications/Criminal%20Justice%20Debt%20Background%20for%20web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2REV-E6EL] (“Estimates indicate that at least 80 percent of people charged 
with criminal offenses qualify for indigent defense.”). 
 181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION:
MOST DEBT IS OUTSTANDING AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD BE IMPROVED 25
(2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689830.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MGE-LLL7]. 
182. For example, between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, Colorado alone had outstanding 
restitution in the amount of $115 million. COLO. OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, supra note 87,
at 23. 
 183. See, e.g., id. (discussing restitution payment plans). 
 184. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N CRIME VICTIM 
COMPENSATION BOARDS, http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 [https://perma.cc/Z55Q-BLQL];
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however, often cap compensation awards, leaving survivors without 
the funds to address more significant needs.186 Lawmakers also may 
preclude survivors from receiving monies from victim compensation 
funds if they themselves have a prior criminal conviction.187 Eligibility 
for compensation is also dependent on reporting a crime and 
cooperating with law enforcement,188 even though many survivors 
choose not to report. Though there are many reasons why that may be 
the case, increased attention to the complexity of survivor interests has 
shown that some do not report out of fear of reprisal, because the 
person causing the harm is a loved one, or because they do not trust 
criminal legal system actors to treat them fairly or criminal punishment 
to improve their circumstances.189 Further, these compensation 
programs may limit eligibility to only those who have experienced 
physical harm, excluding those who experience serious emotional and 
psychological harms or property losses.190 This is the reality of 
restitution practices without graduation. 
The shift to assessing graduation of restitution through an 
abolitionist lens affords consideration of a more complex 
understanding of what it means to make a survivor whole than the 
often-hollow gesture of imposing a restitution award on a person with 
limited or no means to pay it allows. Doing so suggests that the interests 
of survivors and those who cause harm may be better aligned than the 
standard narrative against graduating restitution indicates. 
Abolitionists aim to replace—rather than improve—systems of 
punishment by establishing restorative justice practices designed to 
Crime Victims Fund, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, https://www.ovc.gov/pubs/ 
crimevictimsfundfs/intro.html#VictimComp [https://perma.cc/PTQ6-82AP]. 
 186. See Daniel M. Fetsco, Unpaid Restitution: An Under-Enforced Right of Victims and 
Suggestions To Improve the Collection of Restitution in Wyoming, 12 WYO. L. REV. 367, 274, 379, 
381 (2012). 
 187. See, e.g., Sam Levin, Unfair Punishment Part Two: Sentenced to Poverty, E. BAY 
EXPRESS (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/unfair-punishment-part-two-
sentenced-to-poverty/Content?oid=3861802 [https://perma.cc/MX76-QL83]. 
 188. See Eligibility Requirements, NAT’L ASS’N CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, 
http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=6 [https://perma.cc/H4GZ-2RC2]. 
 189. See, e.g., SERED, supra note 176, at 23–35; LYNN LANGTON, MARCUS BERZOFSKY,
CHRISTOPHER KREBS & HOPE SMILEY-MCDONALD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006–2010, at 1 (2012), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5DQ-DQEC]. 
 190. See, e.g., Crime Victim Compensation, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
https://victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/crime-
victim-compensation [https://perma.cc/U5RE-Z2P4]. 
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meet the stated interests of many survivors.191 Abolitionists 
acknowledge that there are survivors who seek retribution, desiring 
highly punitive responses be imposed on those who harmed them, and 
that the current system may satisfy that goal.192 But because 
abolitionists reject state-sponsored violence,193 abolitionists attempt to 
discern a more nuanced understanding of survivor needs—recognizing 
anger as a valid response to harm but also capturing other concerns, 
including the desire to have a meaningful voice in the process.194 
Restorative justice programs are designed to engage people who are 
harmed and those who commit the harm—as well as members of the 
greater community in some restorative justice models—in a dialogue 
to reach an agreement as to what people must do to make amends and 
how the community can support that rehabilitative process.195 
At their core, restorative justice programs embody the idea that 
people who commit harm must be held accountable196—including in 
some cases through the payment of restitution.197 But these programs 
also are compatible with the understanding that making restitution the 
sole responsibility of a person who commits harm may leave survivors 
empty-handed. As Danielle Sered, Executive Director of Common 
Justice, a restorative justice program focusing on violent felonies, 
explains: “Survivors do not want their healing resources tied to the 
person who hurt them, but they often do want things from that 
person.”198 In particular, survivors report wanting the people who 
 191. See DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 107; KNOPP ET AL., supra note 
35, at 11; see also supra note 31 (regarding the importance that such programs are totally distinct 
from carceral systems). 
 192. See SERED, supra note 176, at 20–22. 
 193. See McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 31, at 1638.
 194. See SERED, supra note 176, at 22–30. 
195. Restorative justice programs take several forms. See generally GORDON BAZEMORE &
MARK UMBREIT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, A COMPARISON OF FOUR RESTORATIVE CONFERENCING MODELS (2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184738.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M7N-VL2W] (comparing 
four restorative justice models). 
 196. See, e.g., GENERATION FIVE, supra note 31, at 5 (“Transformative Justice seeks to 
provide people who experience violence with immediate safety and long-term healing and 
reparations while holding people who commit violence accountable within and by their 
communities.” (footnote omitted)); Herman Bianchi, Abolition: Assensus and Sanctuary, in 
ABOLITIONISM: TOWARDS A NON-REPRESSIVE APPROACH TO CRIME 113, 117 (Herman Bianchi 
& René van Swaaningen eds., 1986) (recognizing that a person who commits harm has a “human 
duty . . . to take responsibility for his or her acts, and to assume the duty of repair”). 
 197. See, e.g., infra notes 286–94 and accompanying text. 
 198. SERED, supra note 176, at 28. 
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harmed them to live up to the obligations imposed in processes of 
repair.199 If restitution is graduated to an amount at which payment is 
feasible, that need can be satisfied in conjunction with other actions 
aimed at holding the person who caused the harm accountable.200 
Along with promoting accountability through the imposition of 
manageable restitution amounts, graduation may also aid in ensuring 
the fulfilment of survivors’ interest in improving community well-being 
through assurances that the person who harmed them will not commit 
further harm.201 Studies suggest that unmanageable economic sanctions 
are criminogenic. For example, some people struggling with such debts 
report committing new offenses, including property offenses against 
others, to obtain money to pay off unmanageable economic 
sanctions.202 Other studies link financial instability—including the loss 
of access to employment or stable housing that may result from 
restitution debt or from deprivations through forfeiture—to 
recidivism.203 By setting sanctions at a manageable rate, graduation can 
act as additional reassurance to survivors that those who harmed them 
will be less likely to recidivate.
 199. Id. at 113, 118 (describing the process of setting “action-oriented agreements” that a 
person who commits harm is required to fulfill and the importance to many survivors that such 
agreements be fulfilled). 
 200. See id. Though one study found that people who participated in restorative justice 
programs were significantly more likely to complete payment of restitution, BAZEMORE &
UMBREIT, supra note 195, at 3, a lack of robustness and mixed results in studies of restorative 
justice programs generally means that more research on outcomes is needed, see  DAVID B.
WILSON, AJIMA OLAGHERE & CATHERINE S. KIMBRELL, GEO. MASON U., EFFECTIVENESS OF 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRINCIPLES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: A META-ANALYSIS 6–7 (2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/250872.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3VW-RTNG]. 
 201. See  SERED, supra note 176, at 29–30 (discussing that most survivors worry about their 
own safety and positing that all survivors want to make sure the person who hurt them will not 
hurt others). 
 202. See  ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMINGHAM 
TREATMENT ALTS. FOR SAFER CMTYS., GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES & LEGAL SERVS.
ALA., UNDER PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT PEOPLE, UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY,
AND DRIVE ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 4 (2018), http://www.alabamaappleseed.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AA1240-FinesandFees-10-10-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN4N-
8R29]; FOSTER COOK, UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMINGHAM TREATMENT ALTS. FOR SAFER CMTYS.,
THE BURDEN OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IN ALABAMA: 2014 PARTICIPANT SELF-REPORT 
SURVEY 12 (2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/uabtasc/the_burden_of_criminal_ 
justice_debt_in_alabama-_part_1_main_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK4Q-PHX4]; Alexes 
Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social 
Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1785 (2010).
 203. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 26, at 436–38; infra notes 269–72 and accompanying 
text. 
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In addition to potentially lowering recidivism rates, graduation 
may help promote community well-being by shifting incentives that can 
pull law enforcement away from attending to crimes that affect 
survivors. A recent study has shown, for example, that the possibility 
of accruing revenues pushes law enforcement and prosecutors to focus 
on offenses more likely to result in the imposition of economic 
sanctions, to the detriment of solving violent crime.204 In particular, the 
study concluded that a 1 percent increase in the percentage of a city’s 
budget generated through economic sanctions “is associated with a 
statistically and substantively significant 6.1 percentage point decrease 
in the violent crime clearance rate and 8.3 percentage point decrease 
in the property crime clearance rate.”205 Interestingly, the study’s 
findings were “driven entirely by cities with populations less than 
28,010 (the bottom 80% of the U.S. city population distribution)” in 
which officers have increased discretion to focus on offenses that are 
most likely to generate revenue.206 The study’s authors posited that 
those results are consistent with the notion that in smaller cities and 
rural areas, law enforcement officers are less likely to be siloed into 
particular units often found in larger agencies—for example, the 
homicide unit or traffic enforcement division—and therefore have 
greater control over what types of cases to direct their efforts toward.207 
That does not mean, however, that the dynamic of prioritizing revenue-
generating activities over violent or property crimes cannot occur in 
larger metropolitan areas. For example, in 2014, the Oakland, 
California, police department reported that it made no attempt to 
investigate 80 percent of reported robberies and 97 percent of reported 
burglaries.208 The department does, however, designate significant 
resources to traffic enforcement, which generates money through 
fines.209 
In brief, a focus on the benefits of graduation to those who commit 
harm pits their interests against survivor needs in a way that allows for 
the appearance that lawmakers have acted to protect survivors by 
204. Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law 
Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFF. REV. 5, 8, 17, 21–22 (2020). 
 205. Id. at 8. 
 206. Id.
 207. See id.
 208. Robert Gammon, Why Oakland Police Can’t Solve Crime, E. BAY EXPRESS (May 20, 
2015), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/why-oakland-police-cant-solve-crime/Content? 
oid=4288948 [https://perma.cc/U66C-QFQR]. 
 209. Id.
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preserving restitution, while in fact current restitution practices do 
little to meaningfully make survivors whole. When viewed through the 
more complex understanding of survivor needs recognized by 
abolitionists, graduation of restitution and other economic sanctions— 
when combined with other reforms aimed at increasing survivor access 
to financial support discussed below—may do a better job at meeting 
survivor needs. 
*   *   * 
Examining the reform of graduating economic sanctions to 
account for financial effect through the lens of abolitionism reveals that 
graduation aids the abolitionist goal of dismantling the carceral state 
by helping people extricate themselves from criminal legal systems as 
payment of economic sanctions is made feasible210 and by shrinking 
funding sources that bolster carceral systems in certain 
circumstances.211 Graduation also aids in the creation of systems of 
transformative justice by potentially increasing monies available for 
social service programs212 and direct restitution,213 and otherwise better 
serving survivor needs.214 At the same time, because making payment 
of economic sanctions manageable likely leads to increased collections, 
graduation simultaneously risks entrenching the status quo by 
disincentivizing lawmakers from critically examining the scope and 
severity of criminal laws and processes,215 exacerbating inequalities 
related to the distribution of funds for social services,216 and by 
disguising the need to address how current restitution mechanisms fail 
survivors.217 Possible reforms that may alleviate these problems are 
addressed next. 
III. ADDITION OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS
This Part turns to how the individual benefits of graduation may 
still be captured while addressing its structural drawbacks through 
 210. See supra notes 126–30, 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 191–209 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 134–48 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 170–90 and accompanying text. 
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complementary reforms. These reforms, sketched out in brief below, 
involve removing revenue incentives that sustain the status quo, as well 
as reinvestment of those revenues in social services and the 
development of nonincarcerative responses to violations of the law, 
including by bolstering access to funds used to make survivors whole. 
By describing the broad strokes of such reforms and their potential 
complications, this Article does not mean to claim that any particular 
policy will create a specific result. To be sure, there are multiple 
hydraulic pressures in play—swings of the tough-on-crime to smart-on-
crime pendulum, the shifting health of any particular jurisdiction’s 
economy, and so on—any one of which may have implications for the 
political palatability and impact, or lack thereof, of the reforms below. 
Therefore, as with any structural change, ongoing study is needed to 
ensure that the desired effects are actually achieved. Rather, these 
proposals are intended to generate attention to the types of policy 
responses that may address implications of graduation captured by 
resetting the baseline from improvements over ungraduated sanctions 
to a focus on broader structural transformation. Though these 
complementary reforms are designed to bring graduation in better 
alignment with abolitionist aims, abolitionists also demand recognition 
of their limitations,218 which are addressed in brief in this Part’s 
conclusion. 
A. Remove Revenue Incentives 
To address the risk that increased collections resulting from 
graduation will cement the breadth and punitive nature of current 
criminal legal systems, a key reform that is complementary to 
graduation would be a prohibition on using revenues from economic 
sanctions for the funding of criminal legal system actors, including 
courts, prosecutors, probation and parole departments, and law 
enforcement. The general premise of this reform is that requiring 
lawmakers to rely solely on tax dollars to fund the entirety of the 
criminal legal apparatus would put the expansiveness and failures of 
criminal policy in much sharper relief thus relieving the myopia that 
access to revenues may cause.219 
One question this proposal raises is whether funding restrictions 
should extend so far as to prohibit the financing of indigent defense 
 218. See, e.g., GENERATION FIVE, supra note 31, at 20 (“[I]t is important to . . . name clearly 
the challenges posed by searches for alternatives”). 
 219. See supra notes 134–48 and accompanying text. 
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services given that it is a component of criminal legal systems that 
would otherwise require tax dollars to fund. On the one hand, indigent 
defense representation is a frontline defense that both limits the 
number of people subjected to punishment and the severity of those 
punishments. In this way, it is consistent with the abolitionist aim of 
shrinking the scope of the carceral state. On the other hand, the 
decades-long gross underfunding of indigent defense systems too often 
constrains the ability of attorneys to provide zealous representation,220 
thereby hamstringing defense counsels’ ability to meaningfully shrink 
the carceral state while simultaneously legitimizing the system by 
appearing constitutionally adequate.221 Further, funding indigent 
defense with revenue from economic sanctions creates a symbolic— 
and perhaps actual—conflict of interest by making the fiscal viability 
of defense systems dependent upon conviction.222 Continued reliance 
on economic sanctions may also leave indigent defense services 
without adequate revenue streams if ticketing rates decline.223 
Another question is whether funding for projects consistent with 
the development of social services but managed by traditional criminal 
legal system actors should also be restricted. In a handful of 
jurisdictions, law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have 
developed programs by which people who otherwise could have been 
arrested are instead provided with housing assistance, job training and 
placement, financial support to meet basic needs, and other supportive 
services, leading to long-term stability and reduced involvement with 
criminal legal systems.224 Economic sanction revenues have, in some 
 220. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1039–40, 1051 (2006); Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a 
Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1783–89 (2016). 
 221. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 
2176, 2195–97 (2013). 
 222. See Brandon Buskey, A Proposal To Stop Tinkering with the Machinery of Debt, 129 
YALE L.J. F. 415, 416–17 (2020) (describing documentation showing Louisiana public defenders 
“exhorting sheriffs and district attorneys to prosecute more traffic offenses,” which fund indigent 
defense).
 223. See, e.g., John Simerman & Chad Calder, ‘It’s Just Not Working’: Funding Public 
Defenders with User-Pay System Doesn’t Make Sense, Many Officials Say, NOLA.COM (Mar. 8, 
2016, 7:02 AM), https://www.nola.com/article_8e476bde-b253-5baf-b17f-4c83982af9b2.html 
[https://perma.cc/KX2A-RAXD] (linking decreased ticketing revenues to shortfalls for indigent 
defense in Louisiana). 
 224. See generally Seema L. Clifasefi, Heather S. Lonczak & Susan E. Collins, Seattle’s Law 
Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) Program: Within-Subjects Changes on Housing, 
Employment, and Income/Benefits Outcomes and Associations with Recidivism, 63 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 429, 431 (2017) (finding that participants were over twice as likely to have access 
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places, also been used to move law enforcement toward a public health 
model to respond to addiction and prevent overdose deaths, such as 
when Morris County, New Jersey, used drug forfeiture proceeds to 
convert a SWAT vehicle into a mobile recovery center.225 It is possible 
that such services could be funded and managed totally without the 
involvement of criminal legal system actors, which would be more 
consistent with the abolitionist goal of dismantling the carceral state.
But it is also possible to understand incremental steps toward a less 
punitive system—even one involving law enforcement and 
prosecutors—as working toward that same abolitionist objective. 
In addition to questions regarding the scope of funding 
restrictions, a separate concern is that a shift of revenues to 
government-funded or managed social services may not protect against 
a recreation of the pathologies—including structural racism and other 
forms of discrimination—that have plagued criminal legal systems. 
After all, inequities in social services related to housing,226 health 
care,227 education,228 and more are long-standing. These pathologies 
may be less likely to be replicated if community representatives rather 
than government officials manage these systems, an idea discussed 
further below.229 But in any event, ongoing review of any such systems 
to shelter, 89 percent more likely to have permanent housing than they were prior to participation, 
and 46 percent more likely to be in job training, legally employed, or retired); SUSAN E. COLLINS,
HEATHER S. LONCZAK & SEEMA L. CLIFASEFI, UNIV. OF WASH. LEAD EVALUATION TEAM,
LEAD PROGRAM EVALUATION: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL SYSTEM UTILIZATION AND 
ASSOCIATED COSTS 2–5 (2015), https://56ec6537-6189-4c37-a275-02c6ee23efe0.filesusr.com/ 
ugd/6f124f_2f66ef4935c04d37a11b04d1998f61e2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX3C-FA4N] (finding that 
recidivism rates for people who were provided case management that included housing services, 
job training and placement, and financial support were statistically significantly reduced as 
compared to a control group of people subjected to standard criminal legal system processes). 
 225. See Albina Sportelli, Morris County Sheriff’s Office Delivering Hope, Naloxone on 
Decade’s Last Day, MORRISTOWN DAILY REC. (Dec. 30, 2019, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.dailyrecord.com/story/news/local/morris-county/2019/12/30/morris-county-sheriffs-
office-delivers-hope-naloxone-new-years-eve/2775250001 [https://perma.cc/N9BC-G5SN]. 
 226. See generally  MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE 
AMERICAN CITY (2016). 
 227. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Most Shocking and Inhuman Inequality: Thinking 
Structurally About Poverty, Racism, and Health Inequities, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 167 (2018). 
 228. See, e.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality in Teaching and Schooling: How 
Opportunity Is Rationed to Students of Color in America, in BRIAN D. SMEDLEY, ADRIENNE Y.
STITH, LOIS COLBURN & CLYDE H. EVANS, INST. OF MED., THE RIGHT THING TO DO, THE 
SMART THING TO DO: ENHANCING DIVERSITY IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 208 (Nat’l Acad. 
Press 2001). 
 229. See infra notes 257–79 and accompanying text. 
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should be undertaken to guard against the creation of unanticipated 
inequities. 
It is also important to recognize that this proposal may have 
unintended consequences, as it could push lawmakers to shrink the 
budgets of other social programs to protect the funding of criminal 
legal systems as they currently stand. In other words, even a lawmaker 
who no longer suffers from monetary myopia,230 may favor the carceral 
state over social welfare programs and direct a now more limited set of 
funds to be used accordingly. There is good reason to believe this may 
be the case. The build-up of the carceral state since the 1960s has long 
been intertwined with the dismantling of social services, with the 
funding of the former prized over the societal benefits of the latter.231 
There are also, however, indications that this may not occur. For 
example, one recent study showed that lawmakers often use forfeiture 
revenues to offset tax dollars that otherwise would have been 
expended for law enforcement; yet, in times of budget crises, those 
same lawmakers are more likely to distribute those funds to bolster 
social welfare programs.232 
Further, any attempt to prohibit the expenditure of these revenues 
will likely be met with virulent opposition by those with interests in 
maintaining the status quo, including law enforcement and prosecutors 
as well as private companies that profit from the carceral state. For 
example, law enforcement and prosecutorial organizations have fought 
against reforms to civil forfeiture for decades. When complaints about 
abuses led Congress to consider significant alterations to forfeiture 
laws, law enforcement and prosecutors engaged in a “‘voracious 
lobbying’ campaign,” successfully killing the most meaningful aspects 
of the legislation voted on in 2000233 thereby preserving the ability to 
expand forfeiture into the behemoth it is today.234 
 230. See supra notes 134–48 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Baicker & Jacobson, supra note 62, at 2115, 2128–29. In addition, the combination of 
this proposal with the redistribution of revenues to the communities from which they are stripped, 
see infra Part III.B.1, may provide some protection against the risk of general defunding. As noted 
above, in some jurisdictions, revenue from economic sanctions is placed in general funds or funds 
used for noncarceral purposes for distribution statewide. See supra notes 162–65 and 
accompanying text. If revenues can be distributed only to heavily policed communities, the 
general defunding of services would primarily affect communities that are less heavily policed. 
Because those communities have comparatively greater political influence, defunding would be 
politically costly. 
 233. See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 20 (quoting former Representative Barney Frank).
 234. See, e.g., Kelly & Kole, supra note 81, at 560 & tbl.1.

		



  		
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 1570 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1529
This reform, however, is more modest than it at first appears. Take 
its likely effect on law enforcement funding. Though these data do not 
capture all forfeitures, fees, and surcharges, and thus likely undervalue 
reliance on monies generated from economic sanctions, data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Governments show that in 2012, only 
15 percent of law enforcement budgets nationwide came from such 
revenues.235 The extent of that reliance, of course, varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and therefore could make a more substantial 
impact on law enforcement capacity in some locales.236 One in ten law 
enforcement agencies saw 32 percent of their budgets come from 
economic sanctions, and a small fraction of those agencies relied on 
such revenues for 90 percent or more of their budgets.237 As reliance 
increases, however, these reforms may effectively target the very 
agencies that prize revenues over public safety,238 and therefore may be 
particularly important to ensuring that law enforcement priorities align 
with the public interest. 
This reform is also likely to generate more political support than 
may be expected. Concerns about abuses related to the use of 
economic sanctions have already led to successful campaigns to limit 
the use of fees and surcharges239 as well as forfeitures240 in some 
jurisdictions. There is also increasing evidence that the electorate— 
including survivors of crime—are supportive of shrinking criminal legal 
systems in favor of building up social services that better address the 
root causes of crime. A 2016 survey showed that by a three-to-one 
margin crime survivors “prefer holding people accountable through 
options beyond prison, such as rehabilitation, mental health treatment, 
drug treatment, community supervision, or community service.”241 
 235. MICHAEL MAKOWSKY, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL TO END REGRESSIVE 
TAXATION THROUGH LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Makowsky_PP_20190314.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6KF-ZAQC]. 
236. It is possible that some jurisdictions merely break even or actually lose money— 
expending more on imposition and collection than they take in from revenues—particularly if 
they rely heavily on incarceration in the collections process. See MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 
23, at 5, 9–10. In such cases, the redistribution of revenue away from criminal legal systems may 
have a particularly strong effect because it even more fully undermines the continued use of 
criminal legal processes as revenue generators. 
 237. MAKOWSKY, supra note 235, at 6. 
 238. See supra notes 138–42, 204–09. 
 239. See, e.g., Selbin, supra note 95, at 408–13. 
 240. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, supra note 77. 
 241. ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, supra note 178, at 5. 
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This is not to say that legislation outlawing the use of economic 
sanctions revenues to fund criminal legal systems is currently 
realistic—at best, lawmakers may be willing to eliminate some of the 
most egregious practices that have been occurring in some states.242 
The point of using abolitionism as a heuristic, however, is not to limit 
oneself to only what is politically palatable in the moment, but rather 
to imagine what a just and fair system would look like and assess a 
policy’s consistency with that end. In other words, “[a] prerequisite to 
seeking any social change is the naming of it,” without which that 
ultimate goal “will never come.” 243 
In sum, legislation that removes the revenue incentive from 
economic sanctions by prohibiting its use for funding criminal legal 
systems may allow the benefits of graduation in individual cases— 
including poverty reduction and extrication from carceral control—to 
accrue.244 At the same time, these reforms still move toward systemic 
abolitionist goals by making it more likely that lawmakers, left to fund 
the carceral state through tax dollars or the reduction of other 
programs, will take seriously the costs and consequences of the system 
as it currently operates. 
B. Distribute Funds to Achieve Structural Reform 
In addition to removing revenue incentives for criminal legal 
system actors, to address the potential inconsistencies between 
graduation’s possible outcomes and the abolitionist aims detailed 
above, funds derived from economic sanctions could be redistributed 
for use in targeted community-reinvestment projects and restorative 
responses to violations of the law. 
1. Targeted Community Reinvestment. Redistribution of revenues 
from graduated economic sanctions to supportive social services that 
address the root causes of crime would be consistent with the 
abolitionst goal of building more equitable communities, at least so 
long as the distribution mechanisms do not promote inequality. Recall, 
in particular, that in some jurisdictions, revenues from economic 
sanctions are placed in general funds or other funds for noncarceral 
 242. See, e.g., Selbin, supra note 95, at 408–13 (pursuing the abolition of juvenile fees). 
243. Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN (Aug. 24, 
2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-mass-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/Z4F6-CLWZ] (quoting Rose Braz, cofounder of the abolitionist organization 
Critical Resistance). 
 244. See supra notes 125–30, 133 and accompanying text. 
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projects for distribution to jurisdiction-wide government programs, 
operating as a regressive tax on the most heavily policed 
communities.245 To remedy the use of revenues from even graduated 
economic sanctions as a hidden tax, these funds could instead be 
returned to the community where the person who was assessed the 
sanction lives or where the policing occurred,with a prohibition against 
offsetting those revenues by funding decreases to general distribution 
programs. Redistributed revenues could then be invested in social 
services and other community projects, including services for survivors 
to aid in addressing trauma and safety concerns.246 
At first glance, this reform appears as if it would have little impact 
given the prior description of the likely small economic effect of 
revenue losses that would be incurred by criminal system actors in 
many jurisdictions.247 Even if the diminished revenue constitutes an 
insubstantial loss to those systems, however, it could be a windfall for 
social services. For example, the police, probation, corrections, and 
juvenile detention budgets for New York City amount to nearly $6.6 
billion annually.248 Because New York City has significant 
transparency problems with respect to its forfeiture practices, it is 
impossible to discern the exact amount of its budget that comes from 
economic sanction revenues.249 Assuming, however, that it runs at the 
national average of 15 percent,250 that would result in an infusion of 
funds for social services of over $986 million annually, which could, for 
example, more than double the city’s investment of $863 million in 
universal Pre-K education programs or nearly match the $1.3 billion 
dollars in funding for its Department of Homeless Services.251 New 
York City has the largest police force in the country252 and therefore is 
 245. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 151–56, 177–78 and accompanying text. For an alternative approach by 
which revenues would be distributed as a direct transfer to low-income community members who 
qualify for SNAP benefits, see MAKOWSKY, supra note 235, at 18–21. 
 247. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
 248. See  CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, LAW FOR BLACK LIVES & BLACK YOUTH 
PROJECT 100, FREEDOM TO THRIVE: REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR 
COMMUNITIES 57 (2017), https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20To% 
20Thrive%2C%20Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6EF-FM4K]. 
 249. See C.J. Ciaramella, NYPD: We Don’t Know How Much Cash We Seize, and Our 
Computers Would Crash If We Tried To Find Out, REASON (Sept. 16, 2016, 1:40 PM), 
https://reason.com/2016/09/16/nypd-we-dont-know-how-much-cash-we-seize [https://perma.cc/Y847-
SWYH].
 250. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 251. CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., supra note 248, at 57. 
 252. Id. at 58. 
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an outlier to some extent, but the redistribution of funds even in cities 
with smaller budgets could be significant. Detroit, for example, has an 
annual police budget of $310 million, so at 15 percent would have over 
$46 million dollars freed up for social service investment each year, 
outpacing, for example, the $43.5 million the city spends on its Housing 
and Revitalization Department.253 Budgets in smaller municipalities 
and rural areas would, of course, be significantly smaller in dollar 
value. But because a significant percentage of municipal budgets in 
such areas come from economic sanction revenues,254 a commitment of 
that funding for social services could have a dramatic effect, 
particularly in rural areas that have difficulty reaching economies of 
scale and therefore often have little-to-no access to social services.255 
While in most cases redistribution to heavily policed communities 
would be both a meaningful addition to social service budgets and 
logistically straightforward,256 the control of such funding by affected 
communities—something of critical importance to many 
abolitionists257—raises complex questions about the meaning of 
“community.” The lack of a precise definition of community has been 
a critique of abolitionism in general, and restorative justice practices in 
particular, given that the borders and interests of the relevant 
community may be fluid and difficult to discern.258 Additionally, 
structural inequalities and hierarchies may be so embedded within 
communities that the very power dynamics abolitionists challenge may 
 253. See id. at 35 (discussing the breakdown of Detroit’s fiscal years 2017–2020 general fund 
expenditures). 
 254. Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html [https://perma.cc/UE45-
FAG9].
 255. See, e.g., NANCY M. PINDUS, THE URBAN INST., IMPLEMENTING WELFARE REFORM IN 
RURAL COMMUNITIES 20 (2001), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/61531/410048-
Implementing-Welfare-Reform-in-Rural-Communities.PDF [https://perma.cc/UNH2-CU4P]. 
256. In some cases, it will be difficult to target revenues back to particular communities within 
a jurisdiction. For example, ticketing and forfeitures on state highways may involve out-of-town 
drivers rather than local residents. See Makowsky & Stratmann, More Tickets, supra note 143, at 
865 (finding that increased ticketing during periods of budget shortfall in Massachusetts focused 
on out-of-town drivers). In those instances, revenues could be applied to victim compensation 
funds. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 257. See Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, 
https://policy.m4bl.org/community-control [https://perma.cc/SP6Z-SXE4] (demanding
“[p]articipatory budgeting at the local, state and federal level”).
 258. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of ‘Community,’ 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 343, 349–63 (2003). 
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be difficult to dislodge.259 Of course, these are not problems unique to 
abolitionism. As Jocelyn Simonson has explained, whether appointed 
or elected, traditional criminal legal systems assume that prosecutors 
and law enforcement represent the interests of “the People,” as if 
community sentiment on crime and punishment are monolithic.260 
Further, traditional systems formally exclude some members of the 
public—for example, barring people with felony convictions from jury 
service—under the guise that doing so weeds out bias and thus achieves 
a neutral approach to community adjudication.261 In other words, the 
complexities raised by the fact that abolitionists center their approach 
on the needs of the community does not necessarily mean that 
abolitionsim is inferior to traditional approaches. 
Separately, the transfer of revenues to support community-based 
services—and especially revenues generated through the imposition of 
economic sanctions—may result in what some abolitionists critique as 
the “non-profit industrial complex.”262 This concern centers on the 
possibility that reliance on such funding may make community-based 
organizations less likely to push for radical reforms, effectively 
entrenching the status quo under the guise of progress.263 It is even 
possible that the redistribution of such funds would lead community-
based organizations, like some carceral actors, to preserve their 
funding by resisting appropriate limitations on the use of economic 
sanctions even when such limitations would better serve community 
needs.264 Therefore, to protect abolitionist aims, it would be important 
to periodically assess such systems to ensure that the organization 
 259. See GENERATION FIVE, supra note 31, at 21 (questioning whether restorative justice 
“allows for challenges to dominant power hierarchies within any given community” including 
racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia); Nicolas Carrier & Justin Piché, Blind Spots of 
Abolitionist Thought in Academia, 12 CHAMP PÉNAL 1, 7–9 (2015) (detailing critiques of 
abolitionism related to the notion of “community”).
 260. Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of ‘The People’ in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 279–82 (2019). 
 261. Id. at 282–86. 
 262. See Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, INCITE!, https://incite-
national.org/beyond-the-non-profit-industrial-complex [https://perma.cc/Y5UU-24CP] (“The 
non-profit industrial complex (or the NPIC) is a system of relationships between: the State[,] . . . 
the owning classes[,] foundations and non-profit/NGO social service & social justice organizations 
that results in the surveillance, control, derailment, and everyday management of political 
movements.”). 
 263. See id. (discussing the concern that the NPIC structure “[r]edirect[s] activist energies into 
career-based modes of organizing instead of mass-based organizing capable of actually 
transforming society”). 
 264. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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“facilitates collective forms of participation that challenge powerful 
institutional actors and dominant ideas of justice.”265 
Another potential issue is that community control of revenues 
does not necessarily guarantee a move away from carceral systems. As 
James Forman, Jr. has documented, for example, African American 
residents and leaders in Washington, D.C., besieged by crime and 
violence in the 1980s, sought a reinvestment in the social safety net but 
also pushed for increases in law enforcement activity and more 
punitive responses to those who broke the law.266 In other words, 
abolitionists’ insistence on community control over revenues and 
responses to crime may ultimately cut against abolitionist goals.267 
Of course, the ultimate acceptance of noncarceral responses—and 
thus of abolitionism itself—will rise and fall with how well supportive 
social services curb crime and improve community well-being.268 
Affected communities, as well as policymakers, may be less likely to 
call for increased reliance on policing and punishment—and to insist 
on the use of revenues from economic sanctions to fund the carceral 
state—if abolitionists are correct that societal conditions will improve 
by addressing the root causes of crime through investment in 
supportive programming. And there is evidence that they may be right. 
An ever-growing body of research shows that supportive social services 
do a significantly better job at reducing crime than traditional punitive 
measures, including ungraduated economic sanctions that can be 
criminogenic.269 To provide just a few examples, studies have shown 
that access to stable housing, educational services, employment, and 
 265. Simonson, supra note 260, at 257. 
 266. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 12–13, 272 n.76 (2017) (“For example, African Americans wanted more law 
enforcement, but they didn’t want only law enforcement. . . . On one hand, they supported 
fighting drugs and crime with every resource at the state’s disposal . . . . On the other hand, they 
called for jobs, schools, and housing . . . .”). 
 267. Cf. Carrier & Piché, supra note 259, at 8 (“[P]enal abolitionism dictates a norm of 
prohibiting retaliatory harm to which, paradoxically, communities that should be self-governed 
nevertheless ought to obey.”). 
 268. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 258, at 363–68 (offering the failure to meet the needs of people 
with mental illness in the community following the movement to reduce reliance on large mental 
health facilities as a cautionary tale).
 269. See, e.g., COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 25, at 9–12 
(discussing literature regarding the deterrent effect, or lack thereof, of economic sanctions and 
other evidence regarding their criminogenic effect); Link, supra note 56, at 155–56 (summarizing 
literature regarding the criminogenic nature of ungraduated economic sanctions); supra note 202 
and accompanying text. 
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mental health treatment,270 or a combination of such services,271 reduce 
recidivism. Not only do those services decrease crime, they also make 
it possible for people who would otherwise be involved in criminal legal 
systems to obtain and maintain education and employment, attend to 
basic needs, preserve family bonds, and thus flourish within the 
community.272 
A real-world example of what community-based services might 
look like is offered by a multipronged community-reinvestment 
initiative that began in Colorado in 2014.273 In addition to providing 
significant funding for comprehensive support services provided to 
people leaving incarceration and managed by the nonprofit Latino 
Coalition for Community Leadership,274 Colorado lawmakers also 
passed legislation that reduced incarceration terms for technical parole 
violations, reinvested the $4 million in annual savings to a grant 
program that provides “direct services and capital for small business 
lending,” and established local planning teams to engage in 
community-based priority setting that would steer grantmaking.275 
Additionally, based on findings of a community survey of crime 
survivors conducted by the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform 
Coalition, Colorado lawmakers created an additional community grant 
program to better address the underserved needs of “survivors who are 
men, people of color and young adults.”276 In keeping with abolitionist 
principles, these projects are designed to improve the economic and 
social well-being of both survivors and people who have violated the 
law. 
Another example can be seen in the work of the Detroit Justice 
Center, a nonprofit dedicated to ending mass incarceration and 
 270. See COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 25, at 11. 
 271. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 272. See, e.g., supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 273. COLO. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM COAL., COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT IN 
COLORADO 1 (2018), https://www.ccjrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Oct-2018-Community-
Reinvestment-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7NK-XG9E]. 
 274. Id. at 1 (documenting the involvement of the Latino Coalition for Community 
Leadership beginning in 2015 after the relevant legislation passed the prior year). 
 275. Id. at 1–2; see also Theresa Vargas, The Hard Pitch: Four Men Who Spent Time in Prison 
Are Now Hoping To Convince People To Invest in Them, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2019, 3:13 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-hard-pitch-four-men-who-spent-time-in-prison-are-now-
hoping-to-convince-people-to-invest-in-them/2019/09/25/1f57e548-dfa4-11e9-8dc8-498eabc129a0 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/UU45-6X7J] (regarding the need for investment into entrepreneurial 
enterprises undertaken by people with criminal convictions).
 276. COLO. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM COAL., supra note 273, at 2. 
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building more equitable communities.277 For example, the Center 
engaged teens in a dialogue about how to spend funds that would 
otherwise be used toward the building of a local jail; the teens zeroed 
in on specific areas of intervention, including a need for robust mental 
health resources, an emergency loan program, affordable housing, and 
increased educational opportunities.278 Through these efforts at 
community engagement, the Center has established an “Economic 
Equity” program, which includes “support for transformative 
economic solutions” like “community land trusts, worker cooperatives, 
and enterprises led by returning citizens,” as well as affordable housing 
for survivors of gun violence and for people returning from periods of 
incarceration.279 
In short, the redistribution of funds away from the carceral state 
and toward community-based social services raises complicated 
questions regarding control, but also a real possibility to better address 
the particular needs of a given community, support social welfare, and 
allow communities to thrive. 
2. Restorative Responses to Violations of the Law. An additional 
reform would be necessary to address inconsistencies between 
graduation and abolitionist goals given the way graduation may cement 
inattention to the ineffectiveness of punitive measures, particularly 
through the failure to meaningfully address survivor needs.280 
Therefore, along with community investments of the kind noted above, 
funding of community-based programs to be used when transgressions 
of the law occur would aid in developing systems of transformative 
justice. 
An example of a project that might address offenses resulting in 
no direct harm is offered by Project Reset, a program used to divert 
people who have committed certain misdemeanor offenses in 
 277. Our Work, DETROIT JUST. CTR., https://www.detroitjustice.org/introduction 
[https://perma.cc/7LNV-6LZW]. 
278. John Jay College, DAY 1: Smart on Crime Innovations Conference 2019, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFUfhl1uqF8&list=PLJFqJKO8C-vT-
HQMhptARjmWk2CGog4oP&index=1 [https://perma.cc/XBR7-XVRZ] (Amanda Alexander, 
Founding Exec. Dir., Detroit Justice Ctr., Address at Smart on Crime Innovations Conference); 
see also Akbar, supra note 30, at 470 (describing efforts by participants in the L.A. for Youth 
campaign to secure funding for community-based employment, support centers, and other 
programs to be funded by an at least 5 percent reduction in law enforcement budgets).
 279. Alexander, supra note 278. 
 280. See supra notes 170–209 and accompanying text. 
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Brooklyn, New York.281 The program requires people to engage in 
educational programming, such as a two-hour curriculum at a local 
museum in which a “discussion is led by teaching artists, whose own 
work centers around themes of social justice and prison reform.”282 
Program participants then create their own artwork “in an effort to 
learn about accepting responsibility and changing one’s personal 
narrative while simultaneously being exposed to art and cultural 
offerings within their community.”283 Originally devised only for use in 
cases involving juveniles, the reduced rates of recidivism among 
program participants was so impressive that Brooklyn soon extended 
the program to adults.284 
It is one thing to use restorative justice programs in cases involving 
low-level offenses, but it may be something else entirely when the 
offense at issue results in serious harm. Abolitionism is often critiqued 
for failing to adequately address how to ensure that society is protected 
from the “dangerous few”—people who may commit acts of violence 
even in a reformed society.285 
Interestingly, however, groups like Common Justice are now 
successfully implementing restorative justice principles in cases 
involving serious violence. These programs bring together the person 
who has committed the wrong with both those who are directly harmed 
and, in some cases, community representatives.286 Together, 
participants agree on a nonincarcerative manner of holding “the 
responsible party accountable in ways meaningful to the person 
harmed.”287 For example, one case handled by Common Justice 
involved a young man named Shawn who had been traumatized after 
he witnessed the fatal shooting of his friend Kenny.288 But in this case, 
it was Shawn who was the responsible party, as a year later he had shot 
at another young man named Daquan.289 Though Daquan was not 
physically injured, he in turn experienced trauma, feeling so unsafe that 
 281. Project Reset: Avoiding Prosecution of Minor Offenses Through Art, ABC7NY (Oct. 2, 
2019), https://abc7ny.com/project-reset-avoiding-prosecution-of-minor-offenses-through-art/5585160 
[https://perma.cc/K3NB-PKMS]. 
 282. Id.
 283. Id.
 284. Id.
285. Carrier & Piché, supra note 259, at 3–4. 
 286. See, e.g., SERED, supra note 176, at 136–37. 
 287. Id.
 288. Id. at 151. 
 289. Id. at 150–51. 
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he left his home in New York to stay with an older sister in 
Philadelphia, disrupting the child care he had been providing for his 
younger sister while his mother worked.290 After Shawn’s arrest, 
Common Justice convened a restorative justice circle, involving Shawn, 
Daquan and his family, and the parents of Shawn’s friend Kenny as 
members of the affected community.291 Common Justice Executive 
Director Danielle Sered explains: 
What they were doing in that circle was in part facing each other and 
the pain between them. But they were also crafting the response to 
the harm in the form of the commitments Shawn would have to fulfill. 
These commitments reflected the group’s shared vision of the kind of 
man Shawn could become and involved college, work, restitution, 
trauma-focused therapy, apologies, peace offerings, public speaking, 
and more. They required him to complete a significant number of 
hours of community service, divided among [Kenny’s parents’] 
church, Daquan’s family’s church, and a variety of projects happening 
in honor of Kenny. These projects all held him closer to the 
community he had damaged through his actions rather than casting 
him away.292 
Because Common Justice requires that all commitments be 
attainable,293 this case provides an example of how graduated 
restitution set within Shawn’s means, along with other requirements 
focused on direct survivor and community healing, can be 
commensurate with restorative justice practices. In Shawn’s case, the 
intervention was a success: he is now employed, engaged in service to 
nonprofits in his community, and has committed no new crimes.294 
While this approach may not be feasible to ensure community safety 
and well-being in all cases,295 it does suggest that even in cases involving 
serious violence, restorative justice approaches can be feasible. 
The use of restorative justice approaches that incorporate 
graduated restitution, however, does not ensure that survivors have the 
 290. Id.
 291. Id. at 151–52. Some abolitionists reject the involvement of community representatives 
due to concerns similar to those raised above. See, e.g., GENERATION FIVE, supra note 32, at 20– 
21; supra notes 257–67 and accompanying text. 
 292. SERED, supra note 176, at 152. 
 293. See id. at 113 (explaining that the agreements reached may be difficult for responsible 
parties to complete and may initially be “overwhelming” but are designed so that all requirements 
are achievable because “the completion of these agreements . . . constitutes accountability”). 
 294. Id. at 152. 
295. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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financial support necessary to aid in their recovery,296 and so the 
expansion of survivor compensation programs is also needed. As noted 
above, graduated economic sanctions will, in many cases, mean that 
restitution is set below a survivor’s full monetary needs297 and may not 
be imposed at all if restorative justice processes result in the imposition 
of nonmonetary methods of achieving accountability.298 A structure is 
already in place nationwide that can aid in solving this issue: the 
aforementioned national Crime Victims Fund program.299 There is no 
reason revenues from graduated economic sanctions cannot continue 
to help populate those funds. But to ensure that victim compensation 
programs are consistent with the stories we tell regarding the 
importance of making survivors whole,300 available funds must not be 
capped and must be available to all those who experience harm.301 
C. Limitations of These Reforms 
The additional structural reforms offered herein bring graduation 
of economic sanctions in better alignment with abolitionist principles 
by ensuring that revenues cannot be used to bolster criminal legal 
system budgets and requiring investment in transformative justice 
mechanisms. Yet it is important to acknowledge that these reforms 
remain limited. First, these reforms still presume that people will be 
subject to policing and prosecution with the imposition of economic 
sanctions to follow. Graduation risks creating a legitimizing effect on 
these practices by placing an imprimatur of fairness on a system that 
remains inherently unfair. In other words, though graduation and the 
additional reforms described herein help reduce the footprint of the 
carceral state, the additional proposals do not guarantee that the 
targeting of politically vulnerable people, and particularly people of 
color, will come to an end.302 Second, these reforms will affect 
communities differently, depending not only on how much of a dent 
redistribution makes in criminal legal system budgets303 and how much 
revenue is freed up for reinvestment,304 but also on broader economic 
296. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 298. Cf. supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 170–83 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 247–55 and accompanying text. 
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and social dynamics, including the existing state of social welfare 
programs and the progressive or regressive nature of applicable tax 
structures.305 Finally, no matter how much of a shift these additional 
reforms create, they cannot fully undo centuries of economic 
deprivation and trauma, reaching back to our nation’s earliest hours, 
that have wrought a “complex and compounding array of injustice this 
better future would have to negate.”306 In short, advocates seeking 
broad structural transformation will not, and should not, be satisfied 
with the reforms detailed in this Article. 
Yet, even with all their deficiencies, the mere fact that these 
reforms may move us toward a future that is fundamentally 
transformed comports with the “gradual project of decarceration”307 
that abolitionists have undertaken. Their challenge has been 
“passionately attending to the needs” of people caught up in criminal 
legal systems—including those struggling under the weight of 
ungraduated economic sanctions—while keeping broad structural 
reform center stage.308 Assessing the efficacy of graduating economic 
sanctions through that lens shows that, particularly when 
complemented with additional reforms that address its shortcomings, 
graduation can help to achieve the transformational change 
abolitionists seek. 
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of abolitionism is its 
requirement that we measure crime policy against a baseline that has 
never existed—an American society “in which punishment itself is no 
longer the central concern in the making of justice.”309 
It would be easy to believe that such a society is unattainable and 
thus abolitionism itself is of little value. But as this Article shows, 
because abolitionism shifts the baseline from the status quo to that 
purportedly implausible future, it forces recognition of a much more 
complex array of consequences—both benefits and drawbacks— 
 305. See MEG WIEHE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS? A
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 1–25 (6th ed. 2018), 
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/whopays-ITEP-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE9N-J89C]
(assessing “tax fairness by measuring effective state and local tax rates paid by all income groups” 
and finding highly regressive tax policies in several states).
 306. Ward, supra note 108, at 7. 
 307. McLeod, supra note 155, at 1161.
 308. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 32, at 103–04. 
 309. Id. at 107. 
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afforded by a given reform. Whether one ultimately agrees with 
abolitionist goals or not, that exercise has tremendous value.310 
That this Article has shown that abolitionism informs critical 
analysis of the graduation of economic sanctions does not, of course, 
mean that either graduation or the complementary reforms offered 
herein will be forthcoming. For an example, let us return to Oklahoma, 
where this Article began. Though press attention and the efforts of pro 
bono counsel resulted in Muskogee County returning the cash it seized 
from Mr. Wah,311 efforts to pass systemic reforms to Oklahoma’s 
forfeiture practices have been beaten back by the state’s law 
enforcement and prosecutors, and there are few signs major reform will 
take place any time soon.312 
But despite the lack of movement in Oklahoma and other states 
on certain crime policies, there are signs that the possibility of 
meaningful, structural reform to criminal legal systems is within reach 
in a way it has not been in recent memory. For example, Oklahoma’s 
citizenry approved a ballot initiative in 2016 that reclassified several 
felonies to misdemeanors, with savings reallocated to fund community-
based chemical dependency and mental health programs.313 The 
initiative was not retroactive, but a bipartisan bill, passed into law in 
May 2019, provided Governor Kevin Stitt with greater authority to 
grant clemency to people who would have received nonincarcerative 
sentences had they be sentenced after the initiative passed.314 In 
November 2019, Governor Stitt approved the largest single-day grant 
of clemency in U.S. history, resulting in the release of 462 people an 
average of nearly a year and a half before their sentences were to 
end.315 One of those people was Kisha Snider.316 Had the court properly 
 310. See Akbar, supra note 30, at 473–79 (calling for legal scholars to engage abolitionism as 
a meaningful method of inquiry).
 311. See Ingraham, supra note 11. 
 312. See Clifton Adcock, Amount of Cash Seized by, Forfeited to Oklahoma Law Enforcement 
Nearly Doubled Last Year, Data Shows, FRONTIER (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.readfrontier.org/stories/cash-seized-forfeited-oklahoma-law-enforcement-nearly-
doubled-last-year-data [https://perma.cc/M9A5-33K6] (“Though the main proponent of changing 
the state’s forfeiture laws is no longer in the Legislature, Baggett said he is not sure whether there 
will be another effort at amending the law in the upcoming session.”).
 313. See Quandt, supra note 128. 
 314. Id.
 315. Id.; Press Release, Office of Governor Kevin Stitt, Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board 
Recommends Largest Single-Day Commutation in U.S. History (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.governor.ok.gov/articles/press_releases/oklahoma-pardon-and-parole-board-recommends 
[https://perma.cc/YF3G-TDLU]. 
 316. See Aspinwall, supra note 1. 
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accounted for Ms. Snider’s financial circumstances before imposing 
unmanageable fees, she would never have been imprisoned in the first 
place.317 But the fact that Oklahoma’s electorate agreed that its 
criminal legal system should be less punitive—and that the savings 
from that reform should be reallocated to fund community-based 
chemical dependency and mental health programs318—suggests that 
abolitionist ideals have begun to take hold. 
 317. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 318. See Quant, supra note 128. 
